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Abstract
Part I of this Article details labor problems in CAFTA countries, with specific emphasis on
problems related to fundamental labor rights. Part II discusses the labor-related trading objectives
mandated by the U.S. Congress in the TPA, including the relationship of those objectives to core
international labor standards promulgated by the International Labor Organization (”ILO”). Part
III then analyzes the labor provisions that are included in CAFTA. To the extent that these provi-
sions do not fulfill the labor objectives set forth in the TPA and do not adequately promote core
international labor standards, Part IV proposes provisions that the United States should include in
future trade agreements.
LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: LABOR
PROVISIONS IN CAFTA
Marisa Anne Pagnattaro*
Decent work should be at the heart of global, national and local strat-
egies for economic and social progress. It is central to efforts to reduce
poverty, and a means for achieving equitable, inclusive and sustain-
able development.'
INTRODUCTION
When the United States enters into a free trade agreement
("FTA"), it has an opportunity to alter the labor playing field
with its trade partners, improving international core labor stan-
dards and creating fair competition for U.S. workers. This was
certainly true when United States entered into the United States-
Central America Free Trade Agreement on May 28, 2004 with El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, and
when the Dominican Republic signed the agreement on August
5, 2004 (these agreements are collectively referred to as
"CAFTA") .2 After much debate in the U.S. Congress, CAFTA
was approved, creating the second-largest free trade zone in
Latin America for exports from the United States and making it
easier for Central American countries to export products such as
sugar and apparel to the United States.' CAFTA also offers an
* Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Terry College of Business, University of
Georgia. Ph.D., University of Georgia; J.D., New York Law School. The author grate-
fully acknowledges the support from a Terry Sanford grant from the University of Geor-
gia for this project.
1. INT'L LABOR ORG. [ILO], THE ILO: WHAT IT IS. WHAT IT DOES. 12 (Geneva,
2003), available at http://bravo.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/download/bro-
chure/pdf/broch_0904.pdf.
2. Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement,
19 U.S.C.S. § 4011 (2005) [hereinafter CAFTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/
Trade.Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFrA-DRFinalTexts/Section_Index.html.
3. See generally Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement of
USTR Rob Portman on House Passage of CAFTA-DR (July 27, 2005), available at http:/
/www.ustr.gov/Document_- Library/PressReleases/2005/July/Statement of USTR_
RobPortmanOnHousePassage-ofCAFTA-DR.html (the House of Representatives
passed CAFTA on July 27, 2004 by a vote of 217 to 215); see also Press Release, Office of
the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement of USTR Rob Portman Regarding Senate Pas-
sage of CAFTA-DR (June 30, 2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLi-
brary/PressReleases/2005/June/Statement ofUSTRRobPortman-regardingSen-
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unprecedented chance to reinforce democracy in Central
America by helping to improve living standards and create
strong economies in this region.4 However, CAFTA is criticized
for not doing enough to promote and enforce international la-
bor standards.5
Although CAFTA contains labor provisions, more compre-
hensive provisions should have been included to truly improve
labor conditions in Central America, where the deficiencies in
labor laws and the enforcement of existing labor laws are partic-
ularly pronounced.6 Ongoing labor abuses include prohibitions
on freedom of association and the right to organize (accompa-
nied by brutal treatment of labor organizers), child labor, and
employment discrimination against women.7 Unfortunately, in-
stead of fully addressing these issues, CAFTA replicates the cen-
tral labor provisions and problems that were present in the Sin-
gapore, Chile, Australia and Morocco Free Trade Agreements.8
ate-passage-ofCAFIA-DR HouseWaysMeansApproval.html (the Senate passed
CAFTA on June 30, 2005 by a vote of 54 to 45); OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTA-
TIVE, THE CASE FOR CAFTA: GROWTH, OPPORTUNITY, AND DEMOCRACY IN OUR NEIGHBOR-
HOOD (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Bilat-
eral/CAFrA/BriefingBook/asset-upload-file235_7178.pdf (discussing the scope of
CAFTA). President Bush signed CAFTA on August 2, 2005. See Press Release, Office of
the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement of USTR Rob Portman on Signing of U.S.-
Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (Aug. 2, 2005), availa-
ble at http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/PressReleases/2005/August/State-
ment ofUSTRRobPortman-onSigning oLUS-CentralAmerican-DominicanRe-
publicFreeTradeAgreement.html.
4. See generally WORLD BANK GROUP, DR-CAFTA: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
FOR CENTRAL AMERICA (June 28, 2005), available at http://lnwebl8.worldbank.org/
LAC/LAC.nsf/0/EF19E9E2E78A00458525702D006DOE7E?Opendocument.
5. See, e.g., AFL-CIO, USTR MISLEADS CONGRESS ON CAFTA LABOR PROVISIONS
(2004), available at http://www.aflcio.org/issues/jobseconomy/globaleconomy/
upload/USTRMisleadsCongress onCAFA.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CAFTA's
WEAK LABOR RIGHTS PROTECTIONS: WHY THE PRESENT AccoRD SHOULD BE OPPOSED
(Mar. 2004) [hereinafter WEAK LABOR RIGHTS PROTECTIONS], available at http://
hrw.org/english/docs/2004/03/09/usint899.htm; Public Citizen, CAFTA and Labor
Rights, http://www.citizen.org/trade/cafta/labor/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2005). See gener-
ally Letter from President Jimmy Carter to Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) (June 8,
2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/DocumentLibrary/PressReleases/
2005/June/assetuploadjfile875-7784.pdf (supporting CAFTA, but noting that im-
provements could be made, "particularly on the labor side").
6. See SANDRA POLASKI, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, CENTRAL AMERICA
AND THE U.S. FACE CHALLENGE-AND CHANCE FOR HISTORIC BREAKTHROUGH-ON WORK-
ERS' RIGHTS (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/pdf/files/
TED-CAFTA-and-labor.pdf.
7. id.
8. See Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, The 'Helping Hand' in Trade Agreements: An Analysis
388 FORDHAMIATERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 29:386
CAFTA also falls short of the trading objectives related to labor
set forth by the U.S. Congress in the Trade Act of 2002 and the
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act ("TPA"). 9 If free
trade agreements are to be an effective way to promote better
working conditions with our trading partners, and if the United
States is committed to protecting labor rights, the labor provi-
sions in CAFTA should improve labor conditions in CAFIA
countries.
Part I of this Article details labor problems in CAFTA coun-
tries, with specific emphasis on problems related to fundamental
labor rights. Part II discusses the labor-related trading objectives
mandated by the U.S. Congress in the TPA, including the rela-
tionship of those objectives to core international labor standards
promulgated by the International Labor Organization
("ILO")." Part III then analyzes the labor provisions that are
included in CAFTA. To the extent that these provisions do not
fulfill the labor objectives set forth in the TPA and do not ade-
quately promote core international labor standards, Part IV pro-
poses provisions that the United States should include in future
trade agreements.
The promotion of fundamental labor rights allows for fair
competition for American workers and supports the right of in-
ternational workers to enjoy the most basic threshold of work-
place standards.1' The advocacy for more substantial labor pro-
visions in this Article is not intended to argue in favor of protec-
tionism or to shield domestic manufacturers and workers from
foreign competition. Rather, it is designed to create a fair play-
ing field in which U.S. workers and companies are not pitted
against foreign competitors who take advantage of their nation's
of and Proposal for Labor Provisions in U.S. Free Trade Agreements, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 845,
889 (2004).
9. Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act ("TPA"), 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 3801-3813
(LexisNexis 2005).
10. As a specialized agency of the United Nations, the International Labor Organi-
zation ("ILO") "seeks the promotion of social justice and internationally recognized
human and labour rights." ILO, Mandate, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/
index.htm. The ILO formulates international labor standards in the form of conven-
tions and recommendations, which may be ratified by its member countries. Id. The
full text of each ILO convention and recommendation, plus ratification information, is
available at the ILOLEX Database of International Labor Standards ("ILOLEX") web-
site. ILOLEX Database of International Labor Standards [hereinafter ILOLEX], http:/
/www.ilo.org/ilolex/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2005).
11. See generally Pagnattaro, supra note 8.
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lack of or failure to enforce labor and employment laws. Ex-
ploiting workers' lack of bargaining power is not legitimate com-
petition. If workers are not able to engage in freedom of associa-
tion and collective bargaining, they have little chance of improv-
ing their working conditions. 12 Ultimately, the goal of including
fundamental labor rights in FTAs is consistent with the larger
goal of the United States: to promote the spread of democ-
racy.' 3
I. THE U.S. TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY: DEFINING
CORE LABOR STANDARDS
In 2002, the U.S. Congress undertook the task of encourag-
ing increased protection of worker rights through trade agree-
ments by mandating the promotion of such rights in the TPA.14
Congressional action was in response to two essential arguments
for including labor provisions in FTAs: First, that labor rights
are human rights and that trade agreements provide an ideal
12. Id. at 847.
13. See generally OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2004 TRADE POLICY
AGENDA AND 2003 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE
TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM (Mar. 2004) (hereinafter 2004 TRADE POLICY AGENDA],
available at http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/ReportsPublications/2004/
2004_TradePolicy.Agenda/SectionIndex.html. In his overview to the 2004 Trade
Policy Agenda and 2003 Annual Report of the President of the United States on the
Trade Agreements Program ("2004 Trade Policy Agenda"), U.S. Trade Representative
Robert B. Zoellick states that America's agenda is "a vision of a world in which free
trade opens minds as it opens markets, encouraging democracy and greater tolerance."
Id. at 8. See generally Maria L. Ontiveros, Work in the 21st Centuy-Creating the Social
Architecture, 37 U.S.F. L. REv. 511, 514 (2004). Ontiveros argues that "Labor move-
ments-at home and abroad-have traditionally served the democratizing function of
allowing and encouraging participation." Id.
14. See genrally TPA §§ 3801-3813. Note that prior to the TPA, Congress tied pref-
erential trade treatment to adherence to "internationally recognized worker rights." MARY
JANE BOLLE, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS WITH SINGAPORE AND CHILE: LABOR ISSUES 2
(Cong. Research Serv., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS Order Code RS21560, Aug. 13,
2003), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/23398.pdf. Examples
include the Generalized System of Preferences, the Andean Trade Preference Act, and
the Caribbean Basin Initiative. See id. (citing 1984 amendments to the Trade Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Star. 1978 (1975), as amended by Pub. L. No. 98-573,
§ 503, 98 Stat. 2948 (1984), as including internationally recognized worker rights). See
also Generalized System of Preferences, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-66 (2000); Caribbean Basin
Economic Recovery Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-06 (2000); Overseas Private Investment Cor-
poration, 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (2000) (requiring a country to be in compliance with inter-
nationally recognized worker rights before Congress provides financing and insurance
for U.S. companies investing in that country).
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context for the promotion of international human rights; 5 and
second, that it is unreasonable for U.S. workers to compete
against foreign workers who are subjected to low wages and egre-
gious working conditions in which they have little or no voice for
change. 6 Included in the overall trade negotiating objectives of
the United States for all FTAs are the following goals: To pro-
mote respect for worker rights and the rights of children consis-
tent with core labor standards of the ILO and an understanding
of the relationship between trade and worker rights;' 7 to seek
provisions in trade agreements under which parties to those
agreements strive to ensure that they do not weaken or reduce
protections afforded in domestic environmental or labor laws as
an encouragement of trade; s and to promote universal ratifica-
tion and full compliance with ILO Convention No. 182 Concern-
ing the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of
the Worst Forms of Child Labor.1"
Consistent with these overall trade negotiating objectives,
the TPA contains three principle negotiating objectives with re-
spect to labor:
1) to ensure that a party to a trade agreement with the United
States does not fail to effectively enforce its labor laws,
through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction,
in a manner affecting trade between the United States and
that party after entry into force of a trade agreement between
those countries;
2) to recognize that parties to a trade agreement retain the
right to exercise discretion with respect to investigatory,
prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance matters and to
make decisions regarding the allocation of resources to en-
forcement with respect to other labor matters determined to
15. See, e.g., Grace H. Brown, Making Coffee Good to the Last Drop: Laying the Founda-
tion for Sustainability in the International Coffee Trade, 16 GEO. INT'L ENVrL. L. REv. 247,
265 (2004) ("The correlation that fair trade labor groups make between a fair wage and
quality of life is considered by many to be a basic human right.").
16. See, e.g., Daniel A. Zaheer, Breaking the Deadlock: Why and How Developing Coun-
tries Should Accept Labor Standards in the WJ'O, 9 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 69, 77 (2003); see
also Juan Carlos Linares, The Development Dilemma: Reconciling U.S. Foreign Direct Invest-
ment in Latin America with Laborers' Rights: A Study of Mexico, the Dominican Republic and
Costa Rica, 29 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 249, 265-81 (2003) (describing the treatment
of workers in export processing zones and maquiladoras in Latin America).
17. See TPA § 3802(a) (6).
18. See id. § 3802(a)(7).
19. See id. § 3802(a)(6), (7), (9).
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have higher priorities, and to recognize that a country is ef-
fectively enforcing its laws if a course of action or inaction
reflects a reasonable exercise of such discretion, or results
from a bona fide decision regarding the allocation of re-
sources, and no retaliation may be authorized based on the
exercise of these rights or the right to establish domestic la-
bor standards;
3) to strengthen the capacity of the United States trading
partners to promote respect for core labor standards, which
are defined as: a) the right of association; b) the right to or-
ganize and bargain collectively; c) a prohibition on the use of
any form of forced or compulsory labor; d) a minimum age
for the employment of children; and e) acceptable conditions
of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and
occupational safety and health. 20
Additionally, the TPA explains that FTAs are to include pro-
visions for dispute resolutions "between governments" in an "ef-
fective, timely, transparent, equitable, and reasoned manner"
that treat "principal negotiating objectives equally" with respect
to procedures and equivalent remedies. 21
By definition, "core labor standards" in the TPA means:
1) the right of association;
2) the right to organize and bargain collectively;
3) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compul-
sory labor;
4) a minimum age for the employment of children; and
5) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum
wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health. 2 2
Consistent with these objectives, the Bush Administration
has "deemed it crucial for the United States to insure that
worker rights and labor standards are addressed in global, re-
gional, and bilateral economic interactions with other coun-
tries. ' 23 Accordingly, the U.S. Bureau of International Labor Af-
fairs "seeks to ensure that the United States Government recog-
20. Id. §§ 3802(b)(11)(A)-(C), 3813(6)(A)-(E). Note that these are the same five
basic worker rights defined as internationally recognized worker rights in the Trade Act
of 1974, as amended, § 502(a) (4).
21. TPA § 3802(b) (12) (A), (G).
22. Id. § 3813(6)(A)-(E).
23. Bureau of Int'l Labor Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Mission & Vision [hereinaf-
ter USDL-BILA Mission], http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/mission.htm (last visited Sept. 28,
2005); see also Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Dep't of State,
Mission Statement for the Office of International Labor Affairs (May 5, 2000), http://
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nizes and promotes international standards of excellence, and
that its bilateral, multilateral, and international trade agree-
ments assure that core labor standards are observed throughout
the world.
24
The TPA is unequivocal in its definition of "core labor stan-
dards," yet it offers virtually no guidance as to what these stan-
dards mean in practice.25 Inasmuch as the standards of the ILO
figure prominently into the TPA trading objectives, and the TPA
states that the President shall "seek greater cooperation between
the WTO and the ILO, 26 it is important to discuss the conven-
tions promulgated by the ILO in its mission to establish interna-
tional labor standards. In a report to the U.S. Congress, the
Congressional Research Service set forth the following table
comparing international worker rights recognized by the United
States with ILO core labor standards:27
TABLE 1: Definition of Core Labor Standards and Internationally
Recognized Worker Rights
U.S. Internationally Recognized
Worker Rights ILO Core Labor Standards
1. The right of association; 1. (1 & 2 are combined); ILO C. 87 and
C. 98.
2. The right to organize and bargain 2. Same; ILO C. 87 and C. 98.
collectively;
3. Prohibition of forced labor; 3. Same; ILO C. 29 and C. 105.
4. Minimum age for the employment of 4. Same; ILO C. 138 and C. 182.
children and protection from the
"worst forms of child labor" (i.e., drug
trafficking, prostitution, and
soldiering);
5. Acceptable conditions of work with 5. Freedom from employment
respect to minimum wages, hours of discrimination; ILO C. 100 and C. 111.
work, and occupational safety and
health.
www.state.gov/www/global/humanrights/drl_labor_mission.html ("The United States
believes that worker rights are human rights. ).
24. USDL-BILA Mission, supra note 23.
25. See generally TPA §§ 3801-3813.
26. Id. § 3802(c) (1).
27. BOLLE, supra note 14, at 2 (citing the ILO core labor standards and the Trade
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975), as amended by Pub. L. No. 98-
573, § 503, 98 Stat. 2948 (1984))). Note that the "U.S. Internationally Recognized
Worker Rights" in this chart correspond to the rights articulated in the TPA. See gener-
ally TPA §§ 3801-3813. For more information on the four core labor conventions listed
above-(I) freedom of association; (2) the abolition of forced labor; (3) the elimina-
tion of child labor; and (4) equality-see ILOLEX, supra note 10, at http://
www.ilo.org/ilolex/.
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A. The Right of Association and the Right to Organize and
Bargain Collectively
The right of association and the right to bargain collectively
are considered to be absolutely fundamental to the advance-
ment of labor rights.28 The TPA explicitly provides that FTAs
should promote worker rights in these areas consistent with the
ILO.2 9 ILO Convention No. 87 Concerning Freedom of Associa-
tion and Protection of the Right to Organise ("ILO Convention
No. 87") provides for freedom of association and protection of
the right to organize. Pursuant to Article 2 of this Convention,
"[w]orkers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall
have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the
organisation concerned, to join organisations of their own
choosing without previous authorisation."3 ' Workers' and em-
ployers' organizations shall also have the right to "draw up their
constitutions and rules, to elect their representatives in full free-
dom, to organise their administration and activities and to for-
mulate their programmes."32 An important aspect of ILO Con-
vention No. 87 is the mandate that "public authorities shall re-
frain from any interference which would restrict this right or
impede the lawful exercise thereof."3' Adopted in 1948, ILO
Convention No. 87 has been ratified by 142 countries."
Just a year after the adoption of ILO Convention No. 87, the
ILO adopted core ILO Convention No. 98 Concerning the Ap-
plication of Principles of the Right to Organize and to Bargain
Collectively ("ILO Convention No. 98"), which provides for the
right to organize and to engage in collective bargaining." ILO
Convention No. 98 states that workers "shall enjoy adequate pro-
tection against acts of anti-union discrimination in respect to
28. See, e.g., TPA § 3813(6)(A)-(B).
29. See id. § 3802(a) (6).
30. See generally Convention (No. 87) Concerning Freedom of Association and Pro-
tection of the Right to Organize, July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17 (entered into force July 4,
1950) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 87], available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/.
31. Id. art. 2.
32. Id. art. 3(1).
33. Id. art. 3(2).
34. See ILOLEX, supra note 10.
35. Convention (No. 98) Concerning the Application of Principles of the Right to
Organize and to Bargain Collectively, July 1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257 (entered into force
July 18, 1951) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 98], available at http://www.ilo.org/
ilolex/.
2006]
394 FORDHAMIATERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 29:386
their employment. '3 6 An important aspect of ILO Convention
No. 98 is that workers and their organizations shall enjoy "ade-
quate protection against any acts of interference by each other
or each other's agents or members in their establishment, func-
tioning or administration." '7 Actions that constitute "acts of in-
terference" under the Convention include those where employ-
ers or their organizations are designed to dominate, by financial
or other means, the establishment of workers' organizations.38
One hundred and fifty-four countries have ratified ILO Conven-
tion No. 98."
B. Prohibition on the Use of Any Form of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Like the right to associate and the right to organize and col-
lectively bargain, the TPA contains a provision stating that the
United States should endeavor to prohibit the use of any form of
forced or compulsory labor.4" Slavery is considered to be so uni-
versally abhorrent that it constitutes a jus cogens violation of in-
ternational law.4 Slavery, forced or compulsory labor are pro-
hibited by a number of international agreements, including the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR"),4 2 the American Convention on Human Rights, 43 the
Hague Convention,44 and the Geneva Convention.45
36. Id. art. 1.
37. Id. art. 2(1).
38. Id. art. 2(2).
39. See ILOLEX, supra note 10.
40. See TPA, 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 3802(6), 3813(6) (2005).
41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702
cmt. n (1987) (explaining that "[niot all human rights norms are peremptory norms
(jus cogens)," but noting that the universal prohibition of slavery is one such norm, and
that "an international agreement that violates [this norm] is void.") Ajus cogens norm is
"a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole
as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and can be modified only by a subse-
quent norm of general international law having the same character." Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
42. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 8(1)-(3), Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
43. See American Convention on Human Rights art. 6, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 143, 9 I.L.M. 673 (entered into force July 18, 1978).
44. See Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art.
6, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 539, 1 Bevans 631 (entered into force
Jan. 26, 1910).
45. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
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The most comprehensive statements prohibiting forced or
compulsory labor are found in two ILO Conventions: ILO Con-
vention No. 29 Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labor ("ILO
Convention No. 29" )46 and ILO Convention No. 105 Concern-
ing the Abolition of Forced Labor ("ILO Convention No.
105"). 4" The first, ILO Convention No. 29, which was proposed
in 1930, has been ratified by 163 Member States.48 It provides
that the term "forced or compulsory labour shall mean all work or
service which is extracted from any person under the menace of
any penalty and for which the said person has not offered him-
self voluntarily."49
ILO Convention No. 105 is an outgrowth of a meeting of
the ILO Governing Body in Geneva in 1957.50 Ratified by 161
Member States, including the United States,5 1 the Convention
provides for specific contexts in which forced or compulsory la-
bor shall not be used:
(a) as a means of political coercion or education or as a pun-
ishment for holding or expressing political views or views
ideologically opposed to the establishment of political, social
or economic system; (b) as a method of mobilizing and using
labour for purposes of economic development; (c) as a
means of labour discipline; (d) as a punishment for having
participated in strikes; or (e) as a means of racial, social, na-
tional or religious discrimination. 52
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21,
1950).
46. Convention (No. 29) Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labor, June 28, 1930,
39 U.N.T.S. 55 (entered into force May 1, 1932) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 29],
available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/.
47. Convention (No. 105) Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor, June 25,
1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291 (entered into forceJan. 17, 1959) [hereinafter ILO Convention
No. 105], available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/.
48. See ILO Convention No. 29, supra note 46. Note that even though the United
States has not ratified this Convention, slavery and forced labor have been prohibited
by Amendment XIII of the U.S. Constitution since 1865. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII
("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude ... shall exist within the United States, or
any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
49. ILO Convention No. 29, supra note 46, art. 2(1). The term forced or compulsory
labour specifically excludes any compulsory military service, normal civic obligations,
work as a consequence of a conviction in a court of law, work in cases of emergency,
and minor communal services. Id. art. 2(2).
50. See ILO Convention No. 105, supra note 47, pmbl.
51. See generally ILOLEX, supra note 10 (noting that the United States ratified ILO
Convention No. 105 in 1991).
52. ILO Convention No. 105, supra note 47, art. 1 (a)-(e).
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Each member of the ILO which ratifies ILO Convention No. 105
"undertakes to take effective measures to secure the immediate
and complete abolition of forced or compulsory labour.'' 53 Con-
sistent with ILO Conventions No. 29 and No. 105 and interna-
tional law, the United States prohibits slavery and involuntary
servitude.54
C. Minimum Age for the Employment of Children
The inclusion of child labor prohibitions in the TPA further
confirms the existence of international concern about this is-
sue.55 An estimated 246 million children work in the global
economy. 56 Of those children, almost 171 million work in haz-
ardous situations or conditions, "such as working in mines, work-
ing with chemicals and pesticides in agriculture or working with
dangerous machinery."57 Over the last forty years, a number of
attempts have been made to curb the use of child labor.58 In
1959, for example, the United Nations General Assembly passed
the Declaration of the Rights of the Child resolution.59 Thirty
years later, the United Nations passed the Convention on the
Rights of the Child.6"
The ILO has also been working to eliminate child labor,
adopting two core Conventions are which address this issue.6 1
The first, ILO Convention No. 138 Concerning Minimum Age
for Admission to Employment ("ILO Convention No. 138"), is a
general instrument, adopted in 1973.62 ILO Convention No.
138 takes into consideration ten previous conventions on child
53. Id. art. 2.
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
55. See TPA, 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 3802(6), 3802(9), 3813(6)(D) (2005).
56. See United Nation Children's Fund [UNICEF], Child Protection: Child La-
bour, http://www.uniceforg/protection/index childlabour.html (last visited Sept. 28,
2005).
57. Id.
58. See Terry Collingsworth, General Counsel, Int'l Labor Rights Fund, Foreign Pol-
icy in Focus: Child Labor in the Global Economy, 2 WoRKERS RTs. NEws 46 (Oct. 1997),
available at http://www.fpif.org/pdf/vol2/46ifchil.pdf.
59. Declaration on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386, at 19, U.N. GAOR, 14th
Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959).
60. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, at 166, U.N. GAOR,
44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES 44/736 (1989).
61. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
62. Convention (No. 138) Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employ-
ment,June 26, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 297 (entered into forceJune 19, 1976) [hereinafter
ILO Convention No. 138], available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/.
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labor that were all applicable to limited economic sectors.6" Rat-
ified by 134 countries,6 4 ILO Convention No. 138 is designed "to
ensure the effective abolition of child labour and to raise pro-
gressively the minimum age for admission to employment or
work to a level consistent with the fullest physical and mental
development of young persons."6" ILO Convention No. 138 spe-
cifically provides that the minimum age for work "shall not be
less that the age of completion of compulsory schooling and, in
any case, shall not be less than 15 years."6 6 Notwithstanding this
age restriction, member nations whose economy and educa-
tional facilities are insufficiently developed may, after a requisite
level of consultation, initially specify a minimum age of 14
years.67 If the employment is likely to jeopardize the "health,
safety or morals of young persons," then the minimum age for
such employment shall not be less than 18 years.68 Even though
63. Id. (citing Convention (No. 5) Fixing the Minimum Age for Admission of Chil-
dren to Industrial Employment, Nov. 28, 1919, 38 L.N.T.S. 81 (entered into force June
13, 1921), revised by Convention (No. 59) Fixing the Minimum Age of Children to In-
dustrial Employment, June 22, 1937, 40 U.N.T.S. 217 (entered into force Feb. 21, 1941)
and ILO Convention No. 138, supra note 62; Convention (No. 7) Fixing the Minimum
Age for Admission of Children to Employment at Sea, July 9, 1920, 38 U.N.T.S. 109
(entered into force Sept. 27, 1921), revised by Convention (No. 58) Fixing the Minimum
Age for Admission of Children to Employment at Sea, Oct. 24, 1936, 40 U.N.T.S. 205
(entered into force Apr. 11, 1939) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 58] and ILO Con-
vention No. 138, supra note 62; Convention (No. 10) Concerning the Age for Admis-
sion of Children to Employment in Agriculture, Nov. 16, 1921, 38 U.N.T.S. 143 (en-
tered into force Aug. 31, 1923), revised by ILO Convention No. 138, supra note 62; Con-
vention (No. 33) Concerning the Age for Admission of Children for Non-Industrial
Employment, Apr. 30, 1932, 39 U.N.T.S. 133 (entered into force June 6, 1935), revised
by Convention (No. 60) Concerning the Age for Admission of Children for Non-Indus-
trial Employment, June 22, 1937, 78 U.N.T.S. 181 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1950)
and ILO Convention No. 138, supra note 62; Convention (No. 112) Concerning the
Minimum Age for Admission to Employment as Fishermen,June 19,1959, 413 U.N.T.S.
147 (entered into force Nov. 7, 1961); Convention (No. 123) Concerning the Minimum
Age for Admission to Employment Underground in Mines, June 22, 1965, 610 U.N.T.S.
79 (entered into force Nov. 10, 1967), revised by ILO Convention No. 138, supra note
62). The full text of each convention is available at ILOLEX, supra note 10. ILO Con-
vention No. 58 sets forth restrictions for children working on all ships and boats, ex-
cluding ships of war and those upon which only members of the same family are em-
ployed. See ILO Convention No. 58, supra, arts. 1-2.
64. See ILOLEX, supra note 10.
65. Id. art. 1.
66. Id. art. 2(3).
67. See id. art. 2(4).
68. Id. art. 3(1). This age minimum can be reduced to 16 years if the health,
safety, and morals of young persons are fully protected and they receive "adequate spe-
cific instruction or vocational training in the relevant branch of activity." Id. art. 3(3).
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the United States has not yet ratified ILO Convention No. 138,69
the child labor provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA") contain corollary provisions."y
The second ILO Convention, ILO Convention No. 182 Con-
cerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimina-
tion of the Worst Forms of Child Labor ("ILO Convention No.
182"), was just adopted in 1999, yet it has already been ratified
by 150 countries, including the United States.71 For purposes of
ILO Convention No. 182, "the worst forms of child labour" com-
prise: (a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such
as the sale or trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom
and forced or compulsory labor, including forced or compulsory
recruitment of children for use in armed conflict; (b) the use,
procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the produc-
tion of pornography or for pornographic performances; (c) the
use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in partic-
ular for the production and trafficking of drugs as defined in the
relevant international treaties; and (d) work which, by its nature
or circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the
health, safety or morals of children.72
For purposes of the Convention, the term "child" applies to
all persons under the age of eighteen.7" Each party to the Con-
vention is required to "take all necessary measures to ensure
[...] effective implementation and enforcement of the provi-
sions," including the application of penal or other sanctions.7 4
Moreover, each party is charged with the responsibility of taking
"effective and time-bound" measures to: (a) prevent the engage-
ment of children in the worst forms of child labor; (b) provide
the necessary and appropriate direct assistance for the removal
of children from the works forms of child labor and for their
rehabilitation and social integration; (c) ensure access to free
basic education, and, wherever possible and appropriate, voca-
tional training, for all children removed from the worst forms of
69. See ILOLEX, supra note 10.
70. See Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(l) (2000).
71. Convention (No. 182) Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for
the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor, June 17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 163
(entered into force Nov. 19, 2000) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 182], available at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/.
72. See id. art. 3.
73. See id. art. 2.
74. Id. art. 7(1).
LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD
child labor; (d) identify and reach out to children at special risk;
and (e) take account of the special situation of girls.75 These
"worst forms" of child labor are considered to be so egregious
that they are specifically referenced in the TPA as a priority in
trade negotiating objectives. 76
D. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The most amorphous of the core labor standards refer-
enced in the TPA are the "acceptable conditions at work with
respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational
safety and health. ' 77 Under domestic law in the United States,
these considerations are primarily covered by the FLSA7' and
the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA") 79 yet, to the
extent that discrimination can affect wages, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,80 the Equal Pay Act,8 ' and the Americans
with Disabilities Act 82 all are relevant. It is not clear, however,
how far-reaching the U.S. Congress intended the trade objec-
tives to extend, yet it should be noted that in its labor report
section on acceptable conditions at work, the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative includes minimum wage, hours of work, occupational
safety and health, as well as a report on women and work. 3 Al-
though the TPA explicitly refers to the "core labor standards of
the ILO, '"84 this final category does track ILO core labor stan-
dards as neatly as those previously discussed. 5
The remaining ILO core labor principle, freedom from em-
ployment discrimination, consists of two conventions, ILO Con-
75. See id. art. 7(2).
76. See TPA, 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 3802(a) (9), 3802(b)(17), 3802(c)(2) (2005).
77. Id.
78. FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000).
79. Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678
(2000). See also Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962
(2000).
80. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII) of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-
17 (2000).
81. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000).
82. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
83. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, LABOR RIGHTS REPORT: COSTA
RICA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA (June
2005) [hereinafter USTR REPORT], available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/
Trade.Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/Transmittal/assetupload-file436_7822.pdf.
84. TPA, 19 U.S.C.S. § 3813(6) (2005).
85. TPA § 3813(6).
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vention No. 100 Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and
Women Workers for Work of Equal Value ("ILO Convention
No. 100")6 and ILO Convention No. 111 Concerning Discrimi-
nation in Respect of Employment and Occupation ("ILO Con-
vention No. 111"),87 which both pertain to wages. Both of these
core conventions are widely accepted, as reflected by the fact
that they have been ratified by over 150 countries.8 8 They are
also set forth in the ILO Declaration as fundamental labor
rights.8 9
ILO Convention No. 100 broadly defines remuneration to
include "the ordinary, basic or minimum wage or salary and any
additional emoluments payable directly or indirectly, whether in
cash or in kind, by the employer to the worker and arising out of
the worker's employment."90 Pursuant to this Convention, mem-
bers shall ensure there is "equal remuneration for men and wo-
men workers for work of equal value."91 There should be no
discrimination based on sex.92 Member States are charged with
the responsibility of employing means appropriate to determine
rates of remuneration, including the use of national laws or reg-
ulations; legally established or recognized machinery for wage
determination; and collective bargaining agreements.9"
Even before Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was passed
in the United States,9 4 the ILO adopted Convention No. 111 to
prevent discrimination in employment.95 The Convention ex-
86. Convention (No. 100) Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women
Workers for Work of Equal Value, June 29, 1951, 165 U.N.T.S. 303 (entered into force
May 23, 1953) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 100], available at http://www.ilo.org/
ilolex/.
87. Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment
and Occupation, June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force June 15, 1960)
[hereinafter ILO Convention No. 111], available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/.
88. See ILOLEX, supra note 10. Note that even though the United States has not
ratified either of these conventions, it has similar domestic laws. See Equal Pay Act of
1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000); Tide Vii, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
89. See ILO, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, § 2(a)-(d)
Uune 18, 1998) [hereinafter ILO Declaration], available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/
declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.staticjump?var-language=EN&var.pagename=DECLA-
RATIONTEXT.
90. ILO Convention No. 100, supra note 86, art. 1 (a).
91. Id. art. 2(1).
92. See id. art. 1 (b).
93. See id. art. 2(2).
94. See generally Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2000).
95. ILO Convention No. 111, supra note 87.
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pressly defines discrimination to include "any distinction, exclu-
sion or preference made on the basis of race, colour, sex, relig-
ion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin, which
has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity
or treatment in employment or occupation." 6 The inclusion of
"political opinion" makes this provision significantly broader
that the protections offered in the United States under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."7 Despite this fact, the U.S. De-
partment of State Office of International Labor Affairs is cur-
rently seeking ratification of Convention No. 11.98 Pursuant to
the Convention, discrimination is prohibited in a variety of em-
ployment-related contexts: access to vocational training, access
to employment and particular occupations, and terms and con-
ditions of employment. 9
In addition to ILO Conventions No. 100 and No. 111, the
protection of wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and
health could be interpreted in a variety of ways and potentially
implicates a number of ILO conventions. With regard to wages,
the ILO has wage conventions0 0 and other conventions regard-
ing other kinds of employment discrimination.10 ' For example,
96. Id. art. 1(1)(a).
97. See generally Title VII § 2000e (prohibiting employment discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
98. See generally Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Dep't of
State, Labor, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/lbr/.
99. See ILO Convention No. 111, supra note 87, art. 1(3).
100. In addition to the Conventions discussed herein, also note the following ILO
conventions pertaining to wages: Convention (No. 94) Concerning Labor Clauses in
Public Contracts, June 29, 1949, 138 U.N.T.S. 207 (entered into force Sept. 20, 1952)
[hereinafter ILO Convention No. 94]; Convention (No. 99) Concerning Minimum
Wage Fixing Machinery in Agriculture, June 28, 1951, 172 U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into
force Aug. 23, 1953) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 99]; Convention (No. 173) Con-
cerning the Protection of Workers' Claims in the Event of the Insolvency of their Em-
ployer, June 23, 1992, 1886 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force June 8, 1995) [hereinafter
ILO Convention No. 173]. The full text of each convention is available at ILOLEX,
supra note 10.
101. See generally Convention (No. 26) Concerning the Creation of Minimum
Wage-Fixing Machinery, June 16, 1928, 39 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force June 14,
1930) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 26]; Convention (No. 63) Concerning Statistics
of Wages and Hours of Work in the Principal Mining and Manufacturing Industries,
Including Building and Construction, and in Agriculture, June 20, 1938, 40 U.N.T.S.
255 (entered into force June 22, 1940) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 63]; Conven-
tion (No. 64) Concerning the Regulation of Written Contracts of Employment of Indig-
enous Workers, June 27, 1939, 40 U.N.T.S. 281 (entered into force July 8, 1948) [here-
inafter ILO Convention No. 64]; Convention (No. 66) Concerning the Recruitment,
Placing and Conditions of Labor of Migrants for Employment, June 28, 1939 (with-
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ILO Convention No. 26 Concerning the Creation of Minimum
Wage-Fixing Machinery ("ILO Convention No. 26") requires
parties to undertake "to create or maintain machinery whereby
minimum rates of wages can be fixed for workers employed" in
certain trades, including manufacturing and commerce.' 0 2 ILO
Convention No. 131 Concerning Minimum Wage-Fixing, with
Special Deference to Developing Countries ("ILO Convention
No. 131") was adopted to compliment wage conventions such as
ILO Conventions No. 26 and No. 100 to provide "protection for
wage earners against unduly low wages" and to also pay special
regard to the needs of developing countries.10 3 The Convention
contains the very significant requirement of requiring Member
States to undertake to establish a system of minimum wages, tak-
ing into consideration: (a) the needs of workers and their fami-
lies, taking into account the general level of wages in the coun-
try, the cost of living, social security benefits, and the relative
living standards of other social groups; and (b) economic fac-
tors, including the requirements of economic development,
levels of productivity and the desirability of attaining and main-
taining high levels of employment.'0 4
In addition to these important conventions regarding
wages, ILO Convention No. 95 offers further protection of
drawn by the ILO Conference May 30, 2000), revised by Convention (No. 97) Concern-
ing Migration for Employment, July 1, 1949, 120 U.N.T.S. 71 (entered into force Jan.
22, 1952) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 97]; Convention (No. 76) Concerning
Wages, Hours of Work on Board Ship and Manning, June 29, 1946 (not yet entered
into force) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 76], revised by Convention (No. 93) Con-
cerning Wages, Hours of Work on Board Ship and Manning, June 18, 1949 (not yet
entered into force) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 93] and Convention (No. 109)
Concerning Wages, Hours of Work on Board Ship and Manning, May 14, 1958 (not yet
entered into force) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 109]; Convention (No. 88) Con-
cerning the Organization of the Employment Service, July 9, 1948, 70 U.N.T.S. 85 (en-
tered into force Aug. 10, 1950) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 88]; Convention (No.
95) Concerning the Protection of Wages, July 1, 1949, 138 U.N.T.S. 225 (entered into
force Sept. 24, 1952) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 95]; ILO Convention No. 99,
supra note 100; ILO Convention No. 111, supra note 87; Convention (No. 131) Con-
cerning Minimum Wage Fixing, with Special Reference to Developing Countries, June
22, 1970, 825 U.N.T.S. 77 (entered into force April 29, 1972) [hereinafter ILO Conven-
tion No. 131]; Convention (No. 145) Concerning Continuity of Employment of Seafar-
ers, Oct. 28, 1976, 1136 U.N.T.S 91 (entered into force May 3, 1979) [hereinafter ILO
Convention No. 145]. The full text of each convention is available at ILOLEX, supra
note 10.
102. ILO Convention No. 26, supra note 101.
103. ILO Convention No. 131, supra note 101.
104. See id. art. 3.
LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD
wages, requiring them to be "capable of being expressed in
terms of money" and to be paid in legal tender to protect work-
ers from unscrupulous employers.1 °5 The ILO also adopted ILO
Convention No. 159 Concerning Vocational Rehabilitation and
Employment ("ILO Convention No. 159") to protect disabled
persons from employment discrimination 0 6 and ILO Conven-
tion No. 183 to protect against discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy. 107 Pursuant to ILO Convention No. 159, Member
States shall "formulate, implement and periodically review a na-
tional policy on vocational rehabilitation and employment of dis-
abled persons."'0' The goal of this Convention is to enable dis-
abled persons to have an equal opportunity to secure, retain and
advance in employment in the open labor market. 0 9 ILO Con-
vention No. 183 offers very broad protection for pregnant wo-
men and new mothers, including a period of maternity leave
that is not less than fourteen weeks, cash benefits of not less than
two-thirds of the woman's previous earnings, accommodations
for breast feeding and a guaranteed right to return to the same
or an equivalent position paid at the same rate at the end of her
maternity leave.1 0
The second aspect of the "acceptable conditions at work"
TPA trading objective pertains to hours of work. 1"' Similar to
wage and discrimination protection, the ILO has adopted a
105. ILO Convention No. 95, supra note 101. Payment in the form of promissory
notes, vouchers, coupons, or in the form of high-alcohol liquor or noxious drugs is
prohibited. Id. arts. 3(1), 4(1).
106. See Convention (No. 159) Concerning Vocational Rehabilitation and Employ-
ment, June 20, 1983, 1401 U.N.T.S. 235 (entered into force June 20, 1985) [hereinafter
ILO Convention No. 159], available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/. ILO Convention
No. 159 has been ratified by 78 countries, including a number of countries that have
entered into FTAs with the United States. See ILOLEX, supra note 10.
107. See Convention (No. 183) Concerning the Revision of the Maternity Protec-
tion Convention (Revised),June 15, 2000, 2181 U.N.T.S. 255 (entered into force Feb. 7,
2002) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 183], available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/.
Only recently adopted by the ILO, ILO Convention No. 183 has been ratified by 11
countries. ILOLEX, supra note 10.
108. ILO Convention No. 159, supra note 106, art. 2. For purposes of ILO Con-
vention No. 159, "disabled person" is defined as "an individual whose prospects in se-
curing, retaining and advancing in suitable employment are substantially reduced as a
result of a duly recognized physical or mental impairment." Id. art. 1 (1).
109. See id. arts. 1(2), 3, 4.
110. See ILO Convention No. 183, supra note 107, arts. 3, 4, 6, 8(2).
111. See TPA, U.S.C.S. § 3813(6)(E) (2005).
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number of conventions pertaining to hours of work.1 12 The
most fundamental and widely ratified convention is ILO Conven-
tion No. 1 Limiting the Hours of Work in Industrial Undertak-
ings to Eight in the Day and Forty-Eight in the Week ("ILO Con-
vention No. 1"), which specifies maximum hours of work for
workers involved in an "industrial undertaking," such as manu-
facturing." 3 The general rule that industrial workers shall not
be employed for more than eight hours a day or more than forty-
eight hours per week is subject to exceptions.' 14 Another widely
ratified Convention on hours of work is ILO Convention No. 14
Concerning the Application of the Weekly Rest in Industrial Un-
dertakings ("ILO Convention No. 14"), which provides that
workers in industry shall have a period of rest of at least twenty-
four consecutive hours every seven days.'1 5 Other less-widely rat-
ified conventions addressing hour issues include: ILO Conven-
tion No. 30 Concerning the Regulation of Hours of Work in
Commerce and Offices ("ILO Convention No. 30") (providing
for an eight-hour work day and forty-eight hour week);" 6 ILO
Convention No. 47 Concerning the Reduction of Hours of Work
to Forty a Week ("ILO Convention No. 47") (affirming the prin-
ciple of a forty-hour work week, which does not result in reduc-
tion of a worker's standard of living);117 ILO Convention No. 52
112. See generally supra note 101 (detailing several conventions promulgated by the
ILO that address work hour regulation).
113. See Convention (No. 1) Limiting the Hours of Work in Industrial Undertak-
ings to Eight in the Day and Forty-Eight in the Week, Nov. 28, 1919, 38 U.N.T.S. 17
(entered into force June 13, 1921) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 1], available at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/. ILO Convention No. I has been ratified by fifty-two coun-
tries, including a number of U.S. trading partners. See ILOLEX, supra note 10.
114. See id. art. 2. For example, workers can negotiate nine-hour days or workers
in shifts may work in excess of eight hours one day and forty-eight hours in one week, if
the average number of hours over a period of three weeks or less does not exceed eight
per day or forty per week. See id. art. 2(b)-(c).
115. See Convention (No. 14) Concerning the Application of the Weekly Rest in
Industrial Undertakings, Nov. 17, 1921, 38 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered into force June 19,
1923) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 14], available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/.
ILO Convention No. 14 has been ratified by 117 countries. See ILOLEX, supra note 10.
116. Convention (No. 30) Concerning the Regulation of Hours of Work in Com-
merce and Offices, June 28, 1930, 39 L.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force Aug. 29, 1933)
[hereinafter ILO Convention No. 30], available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/. ILO
Convention No. 30 has been ratified by thirty countries. See ILOLEX, supra note 10.
117. Convention (No. 47) Concerning the Reduction of Hours of Work to Forty a
Week art. 1,June 22, 1935, 271 U.N.T.S. 199 (entered into force June 23, 1957) [here-
inafter ILO Convention No. 47], available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/. ILO Conven-
tion No. 47 has been ratified by fourteen countries. See ILOLEX, supra note 10.
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Concerning Annual Holidays with Pay ("ILO Convention No.
52") (providing for paid vacation days);118 ILO Convention No.
106 Concerning Weekly Rest in Commerce and Offices ("ILO
Convention No. 106") (providing for one day of rest per week of
work);119 ILO Convention No. 171 Concerning Night Work
("ILO Convention No. 171") (protecting night workers); 120 ILO
Convention No. 175 Concerning Part-Time Work ("ILO Conven-
tion No. 175") (offering protections for part-time workers in ac-
cess to employment, working conditions and social security);121
and ILO Convention No. 177 Concerning Home Work ("ILO
Convention No. 177") (extending protections, including equal-
ity of treatment to persons who work in a place other than the
workplace of the employer).122
The third aspect of the "acceptable conditions of work" TPA
trading objective pertains to occupational safety and health. 23
It is unlikely that the U.S. Congress intended the TPA to require
our trading partners to abide by standards at the level of OSHA,
yet there are wide variations worldwide on occupational safety
and health standards. 124 ILO Convention No. 155 Concerning
Occupational Safety and Health and the Working Environment
118. Convention (No. 52) Concerning Annual Holidays with Pay, June 24, 1936,
40 L.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force Sept. 22, 1939) [hereinafter ILO Convention No.
52], available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/, revised by Convention (No. 132) Concern-
ing Annual Holidays with Pay, June 24, 1970, 883 U.N.T.S. 97 (entered into force June
6, 1973). ILO Convention No. 52 has been ratified by fifty-four countries. See ILOLEX,
supra note 10.
119. Convention (No. 106) Concerning Weekly Rest in Commerce and Offices,
June 26, 1957, 325 U.N.T.S. 279 (entered into force Mar. 4, 1959) [hereinafter ILO
Convention No. 106], available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/. ILO Convention No. 106
has been ratified by sixty-two countries. See ILOLEX, supra note 10.
120. Convention (No. 171) Concerning Night Work, June 26, 1990, 1855 U.N.T.S.
305 (entered into forceJan. 4, 1995) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 171], available at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/. ILO Convention No. 171 has been ratified by nine coun-
tries. See ILOLEX, supra note 10.
121. Convention (No. 175) Concerning Part-Time Work, June 24, 1994, 2010
U.N.T.S. 52 (entered into force Feb. 28, 1998) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 175],
available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/. ILO Convention No. 175 has been ratified by
ten countries. See ILOLEX, supra note 10.
122. Convention (No. 177) Concerning Home Work, June 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 55,
57 (entered into force Mar. 22, 2000) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 177], available
at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/. ILO Convention No. 177 has been ratified by four coun-
tries. See ILOLEX, supra note 10.
123. TPA, 19 U.S.C.S. § 3813(6)(E) (2005).
124. See generally ILO, Int'l Labor Standards: Occupational Safety and Health,
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/subject/occupational.htm (last
visited Sept. 29, 2005).
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("ILO Convention No. 155") contains a general and comprehen-
sive statement on occupational safety and health.1 25 ILO Con-
vention No. 155 requires members to "formulate, implement
and periodically review a coherent national policy on occupa-
tional safety, occupational health and the working environ-
ment. ' 126 The aim of this policy should be "to prevent accidents
and injury to health arising out of, linked with or occurring in
the course of work" by minimizing the causes of hazards inher-
ent in the working environment.
127
Moreover, to give effect to the policy-setting requirements
of ILO Convention No. 155, a competent authority is charged
with the obligation of establishing reporting procedures so that
incidents of occupational accidents and diseases can be re-
corded, holding inquiries into serious situations, and publishing
annually information on measures taken pursuant to the coun-
try's occupational health and safety policy.' 28 ILO Convention
No. 155 also places the onus on employers to ensure that, so far
as is reasonably practicable, "the workplaces, machinery, equip-
ment and processes under their control are safe and without risk
to health;" that "chemical, physical and biological substances
and agents under their control are without risk to health when
the appropriate measures of protection are taken;" and "to pro-
vide, where necessary, adequate protective clothing and protec-
tive equipment" intended to prevent the risk of accidents or ad-
verse effects on health. 129 Employers are also required to have
measures in place to deal with emergencies and accidents, in-
cluding adequate arrangements for administering first aid.130
In 2002, the Governing Body of the ILO met and drafted
ILO Protocol No. 155 to the Occupational Safety and Health
Convention ("ILO Protocol No. 155").' The Protocol, which
125. See Convention (No. 155) Concerning Occupational Safety and Health and
the Working Environment, June 22, 1981, 1331 U.N.T.S. 279 (entered into force Aug.
11, 1983) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 155], available at http://www.ilo.org/
ilolex/. ILO Convention No. 155 has been ratified by forty-four countries. See ILOLEX,
supra note 10.
126. ILO Convention No. 155, art. 4(1).
127. Id. art. 4(2).
128. See id. art. 11.
129. Id. art. 16(1)-(3).
130. See id. art. 18.
131. Protocol (No. 155) to the Occupational Safety and Health Convention, June
20, 2002 (entered into force Feb. 9, 2005) [hereinafter ILO Protocol No. 155], available
at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/.
2006] LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD
entered into force in 2005,112 is intended to further refine the
notification procedures of ILO Convention No. 155.133 In par-
ticular, the reporting requirements and procedures shall deter-
mine, inter alia, the responsibility of the employers and there
should be annual publication of statistics concerning occupa-
tional accidents and diseases.1 3 1 In addition to ILO Convention
No. 155 and ILO Protocol No. 155, the ILO has seventeen con-
ventions pertaining to specific areas of safety and health in the
workplace.1
35
II. LABOR PROBLEMS IN CAFTA COUNTRIES
Much concern has been raised about the adequacy of the
132. See ILOLEX, supra note 10.
133. See ILO Convention No. 155, supra note 125, art. 26.
134. See ILO Protocol No. 155, supra note 131, arts. 3, 4, 6.
135. See Convention (No. 13) Concerning the Use of White Lead in Painting, Nov.
19, 1921, 38 L.N.T.S. 175 (entered into force Aug. 31, 1923); Convention (No. 45)
Concerning the Employment of Women on Underground Work in Mines of all Kinds,
June 21, 1935, 40 L.N.T.S. 63 (entered into force May 30, 1937); Convention (No. 62)
Concerning Safety Provisions in the Building Industry, June 23, 1937, 40 L.N.T.S. 233
(entered into force July 4, 1942); Convention (No. 115) Concerning the Protection of
Workers against Ionizing Radiations, June 22, 1960, 431 U.N.T.S. 41 (entered into force
June 17, 1962); Convention (No. 119) Concerning the Guarding of Machinery, June
25, 1963, 532 U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into force Apr. 21, 1965); Convention (No. 120)
Concerning Hygiene in Commerce and Offices, July 8, 1964, 560 U.N.T.S. 201 (entered
into force Mar. 29, 1966); Convention (No. 127) Concerning the Maximum Permissible
Weight to Be Carried by One Worker, June 28, 1967, 21 U.N.T.S. 39 (entered into force
Mar. 10, 1970); Convention (No. 136) Concerning Protection against Hazards of
Poisoning Arising from Benzene, June 23, 1971, 885 U.N.T.S. 45 (entered into force
July 27, 1973); Convention (No. 139) Concerning Prevention and Control of Occupa-
tional Hazards caused by Carcinogenic Substances and Agents, June 24, 1974, 17 I.L.M.
422 (entered into force June 10, 1976); Convention (No. 148) Concerning the Protec-
tion of Workers against Occupational Hazards in the Working Environment Due to Air
Pollution, Noise and Vibration, June 20, 1977, 1141 U.N.T.S. 107 (entered into force
July 11, 1979); Convention (No. 161) Concerning Occupational Health Services, June
25, 1985, 1498 U.N.T.S. 19 (entered into force Feb. 17, 1988); Convention (No. 162)
Concerning Safety in the Use of Asbestos, June 24, 1986, 1539 U.N.T.S. 315 (entered
into force June 16, 1989); Convention (No. 167) Concerning Safety and Health in Con-
struction ,June 20, 1988, 1592 U.N.T.S. 33 (entered into force Jan. 11, 1991); Conven-
tion (No. 170) Concerning Safety in the use of Chemicals at Work, June 25, 1990, 1753
U.N.T.S. 189 (entered into force Nov. 4, 1993); Convention (No. 174) Concerning the
Prevention of Major Industrial Accidents, June 22, 1993, 1967 U.N.T.S. 231 (entered
into forceJan. 3, 1997); Convention (No. 176) Concerning Safety and Health in Mines,
June 22, 1995 (entered into forceJune 5, 1998) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 176];
and Convention (No. 184) Concerning Safety and Health in Agriculture, June 21, 2001,
2227 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force Sep. 20, 2003). The full text of each convention
is available at ILOLEX, supra note 10. Note that the United States has ratified ILO
Convention No. 176. Id.
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labor laws in CAFTA countries and the lack of enforcement of
existing laws. 136 In connection with the negotiation of CAFTA
and the need to formally access the status of labor in Central
America, the International Labour Office was invited by the gov-
ernments of Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and
Nicaragua to prepare a study of labor laws relating to fundamen-
tal principles and rights at work in each of the respective coun-
tries.'3 7 Specifically, the 2003 study surveyed laws in each of
these countries to determine the extent to which they conform
to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work.13 s The study focuses on what these countries are doing to
promote and implement the most relevant provisions of the core
conventions. As the study notes, each of these countries has
made efforts to codify these fundamental labor rights. 139  In
practice, however, the study is of limited use because it does not
attempt to evaluate the practice or enforcement of the labor laws
discussed; it also does not consider labor laws dealing with other
issues. 1 4  The actual labor practices of these countries leave
open serious questions about the manner in which CAFTA coun-
tries will be able to ensure that their laws provide for labor stan-
dards consistent with internationally recognized standards.
In response to such criticism, the ministers responsible for
trade and labor in the CAFTA countries met under the sponsor-
136. See generally J.F. HORNBECK, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-CENTRAL AMERICA-
UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (DR-CAFFA) (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Re-
port for Congress Order Code RL31870, June 1, 2005), available at http://
fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/48812.pdf (acknowledging the criticism levied
against CAFTA's labor provisions).
137. See generally ILO, Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work: A Labour Law Study
(2003) [hereinafter ILO Labour Law Study], available at http://www.ilo.org/public/
english/dialogue/download/cafta.pdf. Note that the study does not consider labor
laws dealing with other issues. Id.
138. See id. See also ILO DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS AT
WORK (1998), available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/.
139. See ILO Labour Law Study, supra note 137, at 2.
140. See id. at iii; see also LABOR ADVISORY COMM. FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AND
TRADE Poticy [LAC], THE U.S.-CENTRAL AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT REPORT 6-7
(Mar. 19, 2004) [hereinafter CAFTA LAC REPORT], available at http://www.ustr.gov/
assets/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFrAReports/assetupload_file63_
5935.pdf. The Labor Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations and Trade Policy
("LAC") criticizes the ILO report as "commissioned by the Central American govern-
ments, deliberately limited in scope, marked by grave omissions, and written in only a
couple of weeks." Id. pt. V.B (Labor Provisions of CAFTA).
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ship of the Inter-American Development Bank in 2004.14' At
that meeting they established a working group which ultimately
issued a report entitled "The Labor Dimension in Central
America and the Dominican Republic-Building on Progress:
Strengthening Compliance and Enhancing Capacity" (the
"White Paper"), in April 2005.142 The White Paper focuses on
efforts to enhance implementation and enforcement of labor
standards in the region, while also acknowledging that the coun-
tries are constrained by serious resource limitations and employ-
ment problems.143 For example, the White Paper notes that the
annual gross domestic products per capita ranges from slightly
over US$4000 in Costa Rica to as little as US$500 in Nicara-
gua.144 With this in mind, the White Paper identifies six key ar-
eas in which action is needed to improve workers' rights and to
fulfill their larger goal of creating a "culture of compliance" with
labor standards: 145
1) Labor Law and Implementation, regarding a) freedom of
association, trade unions and labor relations; and b) inspection
and compliance;' 46
2) Budget and Personnel Needs of the Labor Ministries, enhanc-
ing resources, personnel and training;147
3) Strengthening the Judicial System for Labor Law, increasing
the number of judges, support personnel and equipment to
avoid delay in the resolution of cases;' 4 8
4) Protections Against Discrimination in the Workplace, assuring
that women's workplace rights are a priority, especially in coun-
tries with a large maquila or free trade zone industry where con-
cerns have been raised about workplace conditions for wo-
men; 149
5) Worst Forms of Child Labor, following through on the
141. INTER-AM. DEv. BANK, THE LABOR DIMENSION IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-BUILDING ON PROGRESS: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE AND EN-
HANCING CAPACITY (Apr. 2005) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER], available at http://
www.iadb.org/trade/Ienglish/pub/labor-CADR.pdf.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 2.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 3.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 3-4.
149. See id. at 4.
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strong commitment expressed by the countries to address child
labor, including the elimination of the worst forms of child la-
bor; 15
0
6) Promoting a "Culture of Compliance," by broadening the un-
derstanding and commitment to compliance from all key actors,
through enhanced education on the obligation with regard to
fundamental labor rights and training on how to effectively im-
plement them in practice.'-"
The focus of the White Paper is how to strengthen labor
conditions in the CAFTA countries. 152 The White Paper ac-
knowledges that much more needs to be accomplished regard-
ing effective enforcement of labor rights in Central America.1
53
Likewise, throughout the CAFTA discussion period in the U.S.
Congress, labor and human rights groups maintained that key
weaknesses in the countries' labor laws remain unaddressed and
if the countries fail to amend their laws they face no conse-
quences.154 The American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations ("AFL-CIO") issued its own report on
labor conditions in CAFTA countries entitled "The Real Record
on Worker's Rights in Central America" ("AFL-CIO Real Re-
cord") .155 This report highlights what the AFL-CIO viewed as
"deep flaws" in the existing labor laws and their enforcement in
CAFTA countries.15
6
In June 2005, the U.S. Trade Representative, in accordance
with the requirements of the TPA, issued the most recent official
report on labor rights in CAFTA countries ("USTR Report").5 v
For each of the CAFITA countries, the USTR Report describes
the national legal framework, the administration of labor law,
labor institutions, the system of labor justice, and the relevant
150. See id.
151. See id. at 5.
152. See id. at 1.
153. See id. at 51.
154. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FAILURE TO PROTECT INTERNATIONAL LABOR
RIGHTS STANDARDS (Apr. 2005), http://hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/hearing0405/
2.htm; AFL-CIO, THE REAL RECORD ON WORKERS' RIGHTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA (Apr.
2005) [hereinafter AFL-CIO REAL RECORD], available at http://www.aflcio.org/issues/
jobseconomy/globaleconomy/upload/CAFTABook.pdf.
155. See generally AFL-CIO REAL RECORD, supra note 154.
156. See id. at 3. Country-specific issues are discussed infra Part II.A-F.
157. See USTR REPORT, supra note 83. The report was prepared pursuant to
§ 2102(c) (5) of the TPA in consultation with the Secretary of Labor. Id. at 1.
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legal frameworks and practice. 5 ' The report also provides de-
tailed information about the extent to which each country ad-
dresses exploitative child labor,'59 and, because CAFTA has been
criticized for failing to protect women workers, 160 the USTR Re-
port focuses on women and work in each country. 1 6 ' Although
this Part focuses on labor problems, it should be noted that the
USTR Report comprehensively details the existing labor laws in
CAFTA countries, which have been improving.162 The most fun-
damental problem seems to be in the area of labor enforcement,
which is widely recognized as a problem.16 Between 2000 and
2004, the U.S. Department of Labor funded a project to reduce
the number of accidents and injuries in the workplace in Central
America and the Dominican Republic, 64 and has committed
US$8.75 million to the Cumple y Gana project for strengthening
labor systems in this region.1 65 To understand the depth of the
criticism about CAFTA's labor provisions, however, the following
discussion details the kinds of labor problems in CAFTA coun-
tries that are at issue.
166
158. See id. at 3.
159. See generally id. "Exploitative child labor" generally means employment that
prevents effective school attendance and work which is preformed under conditions
hazardous to the physical and mental health of the child. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, LAws GOVERNING EXPLOITATIVE CHILD LABOR REPORT COSTA RICA, Do-
MINICAN REPUBLIC, EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA 3 June 2005),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade.Agreements/Bilateral/CAFrA/Trans-
mittal/assetupload file588_7823.pdf.
160. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE UNITED STATES-DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-CEN-
TRAL AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT FALLS SHORT ON WORKERS' RIGHTS 6 (Apr. 21,
2005), available at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/hearing0405/hearingO405.pdf.
161. See USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 5.
162. See id. As will be discussed infra in Part III, however, there is no requirement
for CAFTA countries to adopt new laws and the penalties for failure to enforce existing
laws may not be sufficient to improve labor conditions in the region.
163. See Hornbeck, supra note 136, at 27 (acknowledging that "there is little disa-
greement that labor law enforcement is a problem and that unionization is not wide-
spread").
164. USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 26.
165. See id.
166. See, e.g., Thea M. Lee, Assistant Dir. for Int'l Econ., AFL-CIO, Comments on
the Proposed U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) (Nov. 19, 2002),
available at http://www.aflcio.org/mediacenter/prsptm/tmll192002.cfm; 15 HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE: EL SALVADOR'S FAILURE TO PROTECT WORK-
ERS' RIGHTS (Dec. 2003) [hereinafter DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE], available at http://
www.hrw.org/reports/2003/elsalvadorl203/; Bama Athreya, Deputy Dir., Int'l Labor
Rights Fund, Written Testimony Regarding the Central American Free Trade Agree-
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A. El Salvador
El Salvador is often cited as having the most serious labor
shortcomings in the Central-American region. 167  A 2003
Human Rights Watch report entitled "Deliberate Indifference:
El Salvador's Failure to Protect Workers' Rights," uses eight case
studies to illustrate how Salvadorian workers' rights are "abused
with virtual impunity."6 ' According to that report, only about
5.3% of employees in El Salvador are unionized;169 it is specu-
lated that anti-union practices, such as firing trade unions and
leaders, pressuring workers to renounce their union member-
ship, and discrimination contribute to this low number. 7 ° Em-
ployers are also charged with routinely violating local labor laws,
including delaying the payment of salaries, denying workers
mandatory paid vacations, and failing to pay overtime as re-
quired by law. 7 ' The following Table details selected specific
examples of labor problems in El Salvador:
TABLE 2: Human Rights Practices: El Salvador
The Right of Association * Not preventing the illegal/retaliatory
dismissal of workers or requiring their
reinstatement.
1 7 2
ment (CAFTA) (Apr. 12, 2005) [hereinafter ILRF Testimony], available at http://
www.laborrights.org/publications/CAFA%20Testimony%20April%202005.pdf.
167. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, EL SALVADOR: Gov-
ERNMENT IGNORES WIDESPREAD LABOR ABUSE (Dec. 4, 2003), available at http://
www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/inequal/labor/2003/1204elsalvador.htm; DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE, supra note 166.
168. DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE, supra note 166, at 2.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
EL SALVADOR: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES-2004 § 6(a) (Feb. 28,
2005) [hereinafter STATE DEP'T EL SALVADOR REPORT], available at http://
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41760.htm; see also USTR REPORT, supra note 83,
at 58-59 (citing COMM. ON FREEDOM OF ASS'N, ILO, REPORT No. 330: EL SALVADOR
(CASE No. 2208) 601 (Mar. 2003), available at http://webfusion.ilo.org/public/db/
standards/normes/libsynd/index.cfm?Lang=EN&hdroff=l).
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Right to Organize & Bargain
Collectively
Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory
Labor
* Reports that factories dismissed union
organizers, and that there were no
collective bargaining agreements with
the 18 unions active in the maquila
sector. 173
* Reports of workers being threatened
with dismissal for union-related activi-
ties and of blacklists circulating in ap-
parel factories in Export Processing
Zones (EPZs).
1 7 4
* Allegations that corrupt employees of
the General Directorate of Labor ille-
gally provided advanced information
on union information to companies,
resulting in dismissals and thwarted
union organizing efforts.
1 7 5
" Workers reporting verbal abuse, sexu-
al harassment and, in some cases,
physical abuse by supervisors.
17 6
" The government generally enforced
the ?rohibition against forced la-
bor;?7 7 however, trafficking in per-
sons, primarily women and children
continues to be a problem.
1 7 8
Prohibition of Child Labor * It is estimated that approximately ten
percent of children in El Salvador
work (less than two percent of chil-
dren aged 5-9 work, yet approximately
thirteen percent of children aged 10
to 14 work). 7 9 Child labor is more
common in rural areas.
18 0
* Some children work long hours as do-
mestic servants in third-party
homes. 
18 1
173. See STATE DEP'T EL SALVADOR REPORT, supra note 172, § 6(b).
174. See USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 59; Steven Greenhouse, Labor Abuses in El
Salvador are Detailed in Document, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2001, at A12.
175. See USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 59-60.
176. See STATE DEP'T EL SALVADOR REPORT, supra note 172, § 6(b).
177. See id. § 6(c).
178. See id.; see also USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 62 (noting that Salvadorian
women and children are trafficked internally for sexual exploitation).
179. See STATE DEP'T EL SALVADOR REPORT, supra note 172, § 6(d).
180. See id.; see also HECTOR QUITENO & WALTER RIVAS, ILO, EL SALVADOR-CHILD
LABOUR IN THE URBAN INFORMAL SECTOR: A RAPID ASSESSMENT (Feb. 2002), available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/simpoc/elsalvador/ra/
urbano.pdf.
181, See USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 64; 16 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, EL SALVA-
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* Even though it is known that many
children work, there are few com-
plaints. 18 2 This is likely due to the
fact that there is a large informal sec-
tor where it is difficult to monitor the
enforcement of child labor laws and
many citizens perceive child labor as
an essential component of family in-
come.
1 8 3
Elimination of the Worst Forms of
Child Labor
Acceptable Conditions of Work
* Commercial sexual exploitation and
trafficking of children, especially girls,
is a problem. 18 4 El Salvador is con-
sidered to be a source, transit, and
destination country for such pur-
poses. 185
0 53.6% of Salvadoran workers age fif-
teen or older earned less than mini-
mum wage in 2000.186 Most cases oc-
cur in the extensive informal work
sector, although underpayment of
wages also occurs in the formal sec-
tor.
1 8 7
0 Violations of hours of work regula-
tions are common, including forced
overtime to meet production quo-
tas.
18 8
* Workers in the garment industry com-
plain about pain caused by repetitive
motion and psychological stress
caused by working long hours to meet
production quotas.
18 9
DOR: ABUSES AGAINST CHILD DOMESTIC WORKERS IN EL SALVADOR 13 (Jan. 2004), availa-
ble at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/elsalvadorO104/.
182. See STATE DEP'T EL SALVADOR REPORT, supra note 172, § 6(d).
183. See id.
184. See USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 64.
185. See id.
186. See id. at 68.
187. See id.
188. See id.; see also STATE DEPT. EL SALVADOR REPORT, supra note 172, § 6(e).
189. See USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 69; Jane Turner, Health and Safety in Ma-
quila: Surveys from El Salvador and Nicaragua, CAWN NEWSLETTER, June 15, 2002, at 2, 5,
available at http://www.cawn.org/newsletter/ 15/healthsafety.html.
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Women and Work * Women have fewer economic oppor-
tunities than men.190 Priority is given
to men and women are not accorded
equal stature in traditionally male-
dominated areas, such as agriculture
and business.
1 9 1
* Violence against women is "a wide-
spread and serious problem."
19 2
" Women workers in the maquilas re-
port sexual harassment, verbal abuse,
and, in some cases, physical abuse by
supervisors. 
1 9 3
" Some factories required female appli-
cants to provide pregnancy test results
and did not hire pregnant women.
1 9 4
As Table 2 illustrates, despite many labor laws intended to
protect workers,1 95 there are ongoing abuses of fundamental la-
bor rights in El Salvador.'96 Resource constraints are one im-
pediment to effective labor law enforcement-it is estimated
that thirty-seven labor inspectors are responsible for 2.6 million
workers.197 Equally importantly, however, is what is seen as the
lack of political will by El Salvador's Ministry of Labor to enforce
the law, which is a much more intractable problem.19 8
B. Guatemala
In Guatemala, ILO-assisted revisions to the Labor Code and
clarification by the courts have created a framework of labor laws
that is largely in conformity with international core labor
rights.1 99 However, despite efforts to restructure and modernize
the labor court system,20 ° the courts lack credibility and effective-
190. See USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 71; see also STATE DEP'T EL SALVADOR
REPORT, supra note 172, § 5.
191. See USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 71; see also STATE DEP'T EL SALVADOR
REPORT, supra note 172, § 5.
192. See STATE DEP'T EL SALVADOR REPORT, supra note 172, § 5.
193. See USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 71.
194. See id.; see also STATE DEP'T EL SALVADOR REPORT, supra note 172, § 5.
195. See DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE, supra note 166, at 2.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 73.
200. See BUtREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
GUATEMALA: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRAcTICEs-2004 § 6(a) (Feb. 28,
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ness. 2 1  Labor activists are targets for attacks and threats in Gua-
temala where "[o] ngoing acts of political violence and intimida-
tion" threaten to reverse the progress toward the rule of law
made in recent years.2 °2 Moreover, the offices of two organiza-
tions opposed to CAFTA have been the target of raids in Guate-
mala City where information about their work and membership
lists were stolen. 20 3  There are numerous instances of labor
problems in all core labor areas; a representative selection ap-
pears in Table 3 below.
TABLE 3: Human Rights Practices: Guatemala
The Right of Association 9 The Secretariat of Social Welfare fired
twenty-two individuals the day after
they submitted a list of members for a
fledgling union.
2 0 4
" The most common violation of free-
dom is the dismissal of workers for en-
gaging in unionizing activity. 2 05 The
Ministry of Labor received 2972 com-
plaints of illegal firings in the first
half of 2004. Employees are reluc-
tant to exercise their right of associa-
tion for fear of reprisal by employ-
ers.
20 7
" Labor leaders reported death threats
and acts of intimidation.
2 08
2005), [hereinafter STATE DEP'T GUATEMALA REPORT], available at http://
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41762.htm.
201. See id.
202. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2005: GUATEMALA, available at http://
hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/13/guatem9849.htm.
203. See AMNESTY INT'L, GUATEMALA: FEAR FOR SAFETY (May 13, 2005), available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR340212005?open&of=ENG-GTM.
204. See STATE DEP'T GUATEMALA REPORT, supra note 200, § 6(a).
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. See id. There was even one report that a labor union leader's fifteen year-old
daughter was raped in an attempt to dissuade union members from demanding com-
pensation for wages under the legal minimum. See Frank Jack Daniel, Guatemala Farm
Rape Clouds Free Trade Debate, REUTERS, July 29, 2004, available at http://
www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/fairtrade/coffee/2402.html.
LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD
Right to Organize & Bargain
Collectively
Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory
Labor
Prohibition of Child Labor
* Less than three percent of the work
force is unionized. 20 9 Historically
workers in Guatemala were reported
to be reluctant to exercise their right
to organize for fear of reprisal by em-
ployers; workers who attempted to or-
ganize experienced intimidation and
violence.
" An anti-union tactic used by employ-
ers is the dismissal of workers and an-
ti-union blacklisting allegedly occurs
in Guatemala.
2 1 1 
-
" Guatemala is a source and transit
country for alien smuggling and traf-
ficking of persons (especially women
and children) for sexual exploita-
tion "2 12 there is also internal traffick-
ing. 
13
" Reports of employers forcing workers
to work overtime without the premi-
um pay required by law.
2 1 4
" Informal and agricultural sectors regu-
larly employ children, especially in
_ _ _ 215
family enterprises.2
" An estimated twenty-three percent of
minors under age eighteen worked
during 2004 (with twenty percent of
the group between seven and four-
teen years old). 2 1 6
" On average, working children ages
five to fourteen years work 6.5 hours
per day and five days per week.
2 1 7
209. See STATE DEP'T GUATEMALA REPORT, supra note 200, § 6(a).
210. See USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 82.
211. See id. at 83.
212. See STATE DEP'T GUATEMALA REPORT, supra note 200, § 5.
213. See USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 86; see also STATE DEP'T GUATEMALA RE-
PORT, supra note 200, § 5.
214. See STATE DEP'T GUATEMALA REPORT, supra note 200, § 6(c).
215. See id. § 6(d).
216. See id.
217. See USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 88.
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" Laws governing the employment of
minors are not effectively en-
forced; 2 1 8 their illegal status makes
them ineligible to receive social bene-
fits, social insurance, vacations or sev-
erance pay, and they often earn sala-
ries below the minimum wage.
2 19
" Many children work as domestics in
private homes where they suffer psy-
chological mistreatment, including
sexual abuse.
2 2 0
Elimination of the Worst Forms of 0 Child prostitution is on the rise in
Child Labor Guatemala where street children are
especially vulnerable to sexual ex-
ploitation.221
• Casa Alianza, a non-profit group serv-
ing homeless children in Central
America, reported an increase in gang
recruitment of street children for
thievery, prostitution or drug rings.
2 2 2
Acceptable Conditions of Work * Reports of wage violations, including
illegal deductions in pay.
2 2 3
* Persons with physical disabilities suffer
from discriminatory employment prac-
tices with few resources devoted to ad-
dress this problem.
2 2 4
Reports of pressure to work over the
legal work week and to work off the
clock without pay to meet manufactur-
ing quotas.
2 2 5
Women and Work * Women's inequality in the workforce
mirrors their inequality in the home
and society.
2 2 6
218. See STATE DEP'T GUATEMALA REPORT, supra note 200, § 6(d).
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 88.
222. See STATE DEP'T GUATEMALA REPORT, supra note 200, § 5.
223. See USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 93.
224. See STATE DEP'T GUATEMALA REPORT, supra note 200, § 5.
225. See USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 93-94.
226. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FROM THE HOUSEHOLD TO THE FACTORY. SEX DIS-
CRIMINATION IN THE GUATEMALAN LABOR FORCE pt. IV (Background: Gender and Race
in Guatemala) (2002) [hereinafter FROM THE HOUSEHOLD TO THE FACTORY], available at
http://hrw.org/reports/2002/guat/.
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" Sexual harassment is not illegal;
2 2 7
human rights and women's organiza-
tions reported that harassment is
widespread.
2 28
" Many women face job discrimination;
women receive lower pay than
men229 and are less likely to hold
management positions.
2 3 o
" Some factories require female appli-
cants to present pregnancy test results
and theiy did not hire pregnant wo-
men.
" As a condition of employment, some
female applicants are required to sign
documents agreeing that they will not
have any more children.
2 3 2
Thus, despite many laws that should protect Guatemalan
workers,233 serious issues persist which are likely to remain unad-
dressed by the Guatemala's existing judicial system. 234
C. Honduras
The same issues of enforcement that are problematic in El
Salvador and Guatemala are also present in Honduras, where
the judiciary is "poorly staffed and equipped, often ineffective,
and subject to corruption and political influence. ' 235 Honduras'
market economy is primarily based on agriculture and, increas-
ingly, on the maquiladora ("assembly plant") industry. 236 Ap-
227. See STATE DEP'T GUATEMALA REPORT, supra note 200, § 5.
228. See id.
229. See USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 96.
230. See STATE DEP'T GUATEMALA REPORT, supra note 200, § 5.
231. See USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 97 (citing FROM THE HOUSEHOLD TO THE
FACTORY, supra note 226, pt. II).
232. See id.
233. See STATE DEP'T GUATEMALA REPORT, supra note 200, § 5 (noting laws that
prohibit forced or compulsory labor, protect individuals forming union and establish
minimum wages, for example).
234. See generally Lee, supra note 166 (quoting the United Nations Mission in Gua-
temala which reports "serious legal inconveniences and practices that make it impossi-
ble to achieve effective labor norms such as prompt and thorough treatment by the
justice system").
235. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
HONDURAS: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRAcrIcEs-2004, intro., (Feb. 28,
2005), [hereinafter STATE DEP'T HONDURAS REPORT] available at http://www.state.gov/
g/dr1/rls/hrrpt/2004/41765.htm.
236. See id.
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proximately 7.3% of the work force is unionized. 237 As can be
seen by the examples below, there are numerous labor problems
in Honduras, for many reasons, such as because labor inspectors
are insufficiently trained and enforcement in the maquiladora in-
dustry is poor.238
TABLE 4: Human Rights Practices: Honduras
See id. § 6(a).
See USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 100.
See STATE DEP'T HONDuRAs REPORT, supra note 235, § 6(a).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. § 6(b).
See id. § 6(c).
" Retribution by employers for trade
union activity is a common occur-
rence, often in the form of threaten-
ing to close unionized companies,
harassing workers seeking to unionize,
or dismissing them.
2 3 9
" Blacklisting occurs in the maquilas for
workers who are known to engage in
union activity.
2 4 0
" Union organizers must submit a list of
founding members to the Ministry of
Labor to obtain official recogni-
tion.241 Sometimes, companies re-
ceive this list illegally and retaliate
against the organizers.
2 4 2
Right to Organize & Bargain * Employers often refuse to bargain
Collectively with the union.
2 4 3
Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory * There are credible allegations of corn-
Labor pulsory overtime at maquiladora plants
primarily for women who make up
about sixty-five percent of the
workforce in this sector.
2 4 4
The Right of Association
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*Honduras is a source and transit
country for trafficking for the pur-
poses of sexual and labor exploita-
tion;2 4 5 women and children are also
trafficked internally.
2 4 6
Prohibition of Child Labor Child labor is a significant problem
because the Labor Code is not en-
forced effectively, especially in rural
areas and in small companies.2 4 7 In
2002, the Honduran National Institute
of Statistics estimated that approxi-
mately sixteen percent of children
work illegally.
2 4 8
Elimination of the Worst Forms of * Trafficking in children for commer-
Child Labor cial sexual exploitation and child
prostitution is a problem.
2 49
" In addition to commercial sexual ex-
ploitation, the worst forms of child la-
bor include: fireworks manufacturing,
marine diving, work in limestone
quarries and garbage dumps, mining
and dirt extraction, pesticides, con-
struction, agricultural work (especially
in the coffee and melon industries),
harvestin of sugar cane and the sale
of drugs. 
5 0
Acceptable Conditions of Work e The minimum wage "did not provide
a decent standard of living for a work-
er and family."
2 5 1
" The Ministry of Labor lacks the per-
sonnel and resources for effective en-
forcement of the minimum wage,
yearly bonus provided for by law, pay-
ment of overtime, overtime in excess
of the law, and enforcement of health
and safety rules.
2 5 2
245. See id. § 5.
246. See id.
247. See id. § 6(d).
248. See id.
249. See id. § 5.
250. See USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 111. To combat the worst forms of child
labor, the Honduras government launched programs in 2002, including initiatives to
address the educational needs of working children. STATE DEP'T HONDURAS REPORT,
supra note 235, § 6(d).
251. See STATE DEP'T HONDURAS REPORT, supra note 235, § 6(e).
252. See id.
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* There is no law allowing a worker to
leave a dangerous work situation with-
outjeopardy to continued employ-
ment.
2 53
Women and Work 0 Labor unions, women's groups, and
human rights groups report com-
plaints that employers require appli-
cants to take illegal pre-employment
pregnancy tests, severely limit access
to medical services, verbally abuse
workers, prevent union organizing,
and resq~uire forced and unpaid over-
time.
* Illegal sexual harassment continues to
be a problem in the workplace.
2 5 5
As the most recent U.S. State Department report indicates,
the Honduran government is not effectively enforcing labor
laws.256 The "weak, underfunded, and often corrupt judicial sys-
tem" contributes to the on-going human rights problems, in-
cluding the lack of effective labor law enforcement.
257
D. Nicaragua
Similar labor problems persist in Nicaragua, where approxi-
mately fifteen percent of the workforce is unionized. 258 As has
been seen in other Central American countries, the enforce-
ment of labor rights in Nicaragua is affected by a judiciary sus-
ceptible to "political influence and corruption."259  Moreover,
there were complaints that fines levied by the Ministry of Labor
against employers who violated the Labor Code did not serve as
effective deterrents, because the maximum fine is so low (ap-
proximately US$620), and because companies rarely pay any
fines, as there is no collection mechanism.260
253. See id.
254. See USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 118-19.
255. See id. at 119.
256. See STATE DEP'T HONDURAS REPORT, supra note 235, intro.
257. See id.
258. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
NICARAGUA: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRAcrICES-2004, § 6(a) (Feb. 28,
2005) [hereinafter STATE DEP'T NICARAGUA REPORT], available at http://www.state.gov/
g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2OO4/index.htm. See also USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 129-42.
259. See STATE DEP'T NICARAGUA REPORT, supra note 258, at intro.
260. See id. § 6(b).
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TABLE 5: Human Rights Practices: Nicaragua
261. See id. § 6(a).
262. See id. § 6(b).
263. See id. § 6(c).
264. See id. § 6(d).
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. See id. §§ 5, 6(d).
The Right of Association Representatives of labor unions criti-
cize "cooperatives" into which trans-
portation and agricultural workers are
organized for not permitting strikes,
having inadequate grievance proce-
dures, and for displacing genuine in-
dependent trade unions which are not
dominated by employers.
2 6 1
Right to Organize & Bargain * Allegations of violations of the right
Collectively to organize, especially that employers
fired employees who were trying to
form a union.
2 6 2
Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory *Although the Nicaraguan Constitution
Labor prohibits forced or compulsory labor,
it does not specifically address forced
or compulsory labor by children and
such practices occur.
Prohibition of Child Labor * Child labor rules are rarely enforced
(except in the small formal sector of
the economy).264 This is largely due
to the economic needs of many fami-
lies, a cultural legacy of child work
among peasants, and the lack of effec-
tive government enforcement mecha-
• -265
nisms.
* Child labor occurs in both urban and
rural areas, with the majority working
in the informal sector.
26 6
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child prostitution and trafficking of
Child Labor children to other countries for pur-
poses of sexual exploitation is a prob-
lem.
2 6 7
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Acceptable Conditions of Work
* The Ministry of Labor reports that
thousands of children are forced to
beg by their parents (some parents
rented their children to organizers of
child beggars), spent their days scav-
enging in garbage dumps, and work-
ing on coffee farms.
2 6 8
" The national minimum wage did not
provide a decent standard of living for
a worker and family.
2 6 9
* The constitutionally-mandated eight
hour work day, maximum forty-eight
hour work week with one day of rest
was routinely ignored by employ-
ers.
2 7 °
" The Ministry of Labor's Office of Hy-
giene and Occupational Security lacks
adequate staff and resources to en-
force workplace hygiene and safety
standards. I
" Workers complain about poor work-
ing conditions, being forced to work
unpaid overtime, and restrictions on
when they may go to the toilet.
2 7 2
Women and Work * Even with comparable educational
backgrounds, salaries for male and fe-
male workers differ significantly, with
men sometimes making twice as much
as women in the same positions.
2 7 3
* Domestic and sexual violence are
widespread and underreported.
2 7 4
* Sexual harassment in the workplace is
a widespread problem; 2 7 5 the penal-
ties are negligible and the govern-
ment does little to enforce the law.
2 7 6
268. See id. § 6(d).
269. See id. § 6(e).
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. See USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 142 (citing BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, NICARAGUA: COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTiCES-2003, § 5, (Feb. 25, 2004) available at http://www.state.gov/
g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27906.htm (referencing a 2000 survey sponsored by the Nicara-
guan Women's Institute)).
274. See STATE DEP'T NICARAGUA REPORT, supra note 258, § 5.
275. See id.
276. See id.
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With the assistance of the ILO, Nicaragua adopted a fairly
comprehensive Labor Code in 1996277 yet, as can be seen by
these examples, enforcement continues to be a major shortcom-
ing to the achievement of labor rights.
E. Costa Rica
Among the five countries that originally signed CAFTA,
Costa Rica maintains the best labor conditions.2 7  This is likely
due to the relatively effective operation of the political system
and the presidential term of Abel Pacheco de la Espriella, who
won fifty-eight percent of the vote in a fair and free election in
2002.279 An independent judiciary also undoubtedly contributes
to improved labor standards and better enforcement than in
other Central American countries. 28 0 In 2004, for example, the
Ministry of Labor continued to work on resolving a number of
cases from previous years.28' In Costa Rica, approximately twelve
percent of the work force is unionized.282
TABLE 6: Human Rights Practices: Costa Rica
The Right of Association * Enforcement is lax regarding protec-
tion from dismissal for union or-
ganizers and members during union
formation.
2 8 3
Right to Organize & Bargain * Unions complained about the burden-
Collectively some administrative requirements in
order for a strike to be legal.
2 8 4
277. See USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 120.
278. See generally WHITE PAPER, supra note 141 (evaluating the implementation and
enforcement of labor standards in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and
Nicaragua).
279. See BuirAu or DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
COSTA RICA: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACrICEs-2004, at intro. (Feb. 28,
2005) [hereinafter STATE DEP'T COSTA RCA REPORT], available at http://www.state.gov/
g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41755.htm.
280. See id.
281. See id. § 6(a).
282. See id.
283. See id.
284. See id. § 6(b). Workers, however, are able to exercise their right to organize
strike and engage in collective bargaining. Id.
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Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Forced and compulsory labor, includ-
Labor ing by children, is prohibited by the
Costa Rica Constitution and there
were no reports of such practices in
2004.285
Prohibition of Child Labor Child labor is a problem mainly in the
informal sector of the economy, in-
cluding small-scale agriculture, domes-
tic work, and family enterprises.
2 8 6
Elimination of the Worst Forms of * Child prostitution is a serious problem
Child Labor and it is estimated that 3,000 children
suffered from commercial sexual ex-
ploitation in 2004.287
Acceptable Conditions of Work * Although the Ministry of Labor effec-
tively enforced minimum wages in the
San Jose area, it did so less effectively
in rural areas, especially where large
numbers of migrant workers are em-
ployed.
28 8
" The national minimum wage does not
provide a decent standard of living for
a worker and family.
2 8 9
" Agricultural workers often do not re-
ceive overtime pay if they work volun-
tarily beyond their daily work shift.
2 90
* Workers who exercise their legal right
to leave work if conditions become
dangerous may jeopardize their jobs
unless they file written complaints
with the Ministry of Labor.
29 1
Women and Work * The estimated earned income for wo-
men is approximately seventy-eight
percent of the earned income for
men, despite the fact that twenty per-
cent of women in the workforce have
some university instruction, compared
with eleven percent of men.
2 9 2
285. See id. § 6c.
286. See id. § 6d. A new child labor awareness campaign was initiated in 2004,
which is designed to remove children from work and return them to school. Id.
287. See id. § 5.
288. See id. § 6(e).
289. See id.
290. See id.
291. See id.
292. See id. § 5.
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Although child labor persists in Costa Rica, despite efforts
by the government to increase awareness and eradicate it, 29 5 la-
bor conditions are on the right track to meet international core
labor rights standards.
F. Dominican Republic
Like the other parties to CAFTA, the Dominican Republic is
a democracy, yet serious human rights issues persist creating an
overall oppressive situation which, in turn, also affects labor stan-
dards.296 At the most primary level, internal corruption and in-
terference from outside authorities prevent the judiciary from
being independent and enforcement of judgments from the la-
bor courts can be unreliable.2 97 The government's human rights
record is "poor," with members of the security forces continuing
to commit unlawful killings. 29  Serious labor-related problems
noted below persist in a wide range of areas and local wages are
not keeping pace with an annual inflation rate estimated at
twenty-nine percent.299
293. See USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 28.
294. See id.
295. See STATE DEP'T COSTA RICA REPORT, supra note 279, at intro.
296. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES-2004, at intro.
(Feb. 28, 2005) [hereinafter STATE DEP'T DOMINICAN REPUBLIC REPORT], available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41758.htm.
297. See id. § 6(b).
298. See id. intro.
299. See id.
* Occupational segregation locates most
women in the services sector where
the wage gap is more pronounced.
2 9 3
* Because pregnancy testing and dis-
crimination has been a problem, the
national directive on discrimination at
work was amended in March 2005 to
address these issues.
2 9 4
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TABLE 7: Human Rights Practices: Dominican Republic
The Right of Association
Right to Organize & Bargain
Collectively
" The law forbidding companies from
firing union organizers or members is
enforced inconsistently and penalties
are insufficient to deter employers
from violating worker rights.
°3 0
" The Dominican Federation of Free
Trade Zone Workers reports anti-
union activity at the FM company in
Santiago, a production facility belong-
ing to apparel manufacturing firm
Grupo M, the largest private sector
employer in the country.
3 0 1
" The majority of Haitian laborers in
the sugar and construction industries
do not exercise their rights under the
Labor Code because they fear depor-
tation or job loss.3
0 2
" Reports of widespread covert intimida-
tion by employers in Free Trade
Zones ("FTZs") to prevent union activ-
ity.3 03 Unions in FTZs report mem-
bers hesitating to discuss union activi-
ty at work for fear of job loss.3 0 4 It is
estimated that less than ten percent of
the workers in FTZs are unionized.
30 5
• The International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions ("IFCTU") claims
that the Santiago FTZ has hired thugs
to prevent union organization and
that blacklists of union activists are
circulated in the FTZs.
30 6
Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Mandatory overtime is a common
Labor practice and it is sometimes enforced
by locking the doors or loss of jobs
and/or pay for workers who re-
fuse.
3 0 7
300. See id. § 6(a).
301. See id.
302. See id. § 6(b).
303. See id. §6(a).
304. See id. §6(b).
305. See id. According to the State Department's Report, employer resistance to
union organization in the Dominican Republic has increased in response to growing
pressure from firms in other Central American countries and China. Id.
306. See USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 36.
307. See STATE DEP'T DOMINICAN REPUBLIC REPORT, supra note 296, § 6(b), (c).
i
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Prohibition of Child Labor
Elimination of the Worst Forms of
Child Labor
+
" Reports of workers in sugarcane plan-
tations are prevented from leaving
during the harvest season.
3 0 8
" The Dominican Republic is a source,
transit, and destination country for
persons trafficked for the purposes of
sexual exploitation and forced la-
bor.
3 09
• Tens of thousands of children begin
working before the age of fourteen,
primarily in the informal economy,
small businesses, clandestine factories,
and sugarcane fields.3 10 The high
level of unemployment and the lack
of a social safety net create pressures
on families to allow or encourage
their children to work.
3 1 1
" Some young children, particularly
Haitians, are "adopted" by families
and work in indentured servitude.
3 1 2
" There is evidence that poor Haitian
and Dominican adolescents accompa-
ny their parents to work in the cane
fields with the tacit approval of the
sugar companies.3 13 Children twelve
years old and younger also work plant-
ing sugarcane for as little as US$1 for
a full day's labor.
3 1 4
" Within the Dominican Republic, the
prostitution of minors is a serious
problem; it is estimated that up to
30,000 children and adolescents may
be involved in the sex industry.
3 1 5
" An official study in 2003 estimates
that fifty to sixty Haitian children
were trafficked into the country each
week and many Haitian girls were
brought into the country to work as
prostitutes.
3 1 6
308. See id. § 6(c).
309. See USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 39.
310. See STATE DEP'T DOMINICAN REPUBLIC REPORT, supra note 296, § 6(d).
311. See id.
312. See id. § 6(c).
313. See id. § 6(d).
314. See id.
315. See id. § 5.
316. See id.
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Acceptable Conditions of Work * The national minimum wage does not
provide a decent standard of living for
a worker and family.
3 1 7
* Minimum wage violations primarily
occur in the sugarcane plantations, es-
pecially those that are privatized.
3 1 8
An insufficient number of labor in-
spectors and a large number of un-
documented workers contribute to
this problem.31 9 There have also
been reports of employers withhold-
ing the pay and personal items of la-
borers to make sure they will not
leave the plantations.
3 2 0
" HIV testing in the workplace is pro-
hibited by law, 3 2 1 yet many compa-
nies routinely test workers and appli-
cants;3 2 2 on the basis of a positive
test, workers were fired or not
hired.
3 2 3
" Many workers on sugarcane planta-
tions are forced to buy products from
company stores that charge ten per-
cent interest.
3 2 4
" Persons with disabilities encounter dis-
crimination in employment.
3 2 5
" There is strong prejudice against Hai-
tians, Dominicans of Haitian ancestry,
and foreigners of dark complex-
ion.
3 2 6
" The Labor Code requires employers
to provide a safe working environ-327
ment, but the practical reality is
that workers cannot remove them-
selves from hazardous situations with-
out losing their jobs.3
2 8
317. See id. § 6(e).
318. See USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 45.
319. See id.
320. See id.; see also STATE DEP'T DOMINICAN REPUBLIC REPORT, supra note 296,
§ 6(e).
321. See STATE DEP'T DOMINICAN REPUBLIC REPORT, supra note 296, § 5.
322. See id.
323. See id. § 6(e).
324. See USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 45-46.
325. See STATE DEP'T DOMINICAN REPUBLIC REPORT, supra note 296, § 5.
326. See id. §§ 1(d), 2(d), 5.
327. See id. § 6(e).
328. See id.
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Women and Work * The law prohibiting sexual harassment
is not enforced and it is a prob-
lem.3 2 9 The Dominican Labor Foun-
dation estimates that approximately
forty percent of female workers in the
FTZs are victims of sexual harassment
by supervisors or coworkers.3 30 Wo-
men who resist sexual advances of su-
pervisors are fired, threatened or oth-
erwise discriminated against.
3 1
" Women experience discrimination in
the workplace; 3 3 2 they do not enjoy
equal social and economic status or
opportunity with men; men hold the
majority of leadership positions; wo-
men are often paid less than men for
jobs of equal content and skill lev-
el.
3 3 3
" Some employers give pregnancy tests
to women before hiring them as part
of a required medical exam. 4 Preg-
nant women are often not hired, and
female employees who become preg-
nant are sometimes fired.
3 3 5
" There are no effective government
programs to combat economic dis-
crimination against women.
3 3 6
" Women are routinely tested for HIV
as a condition for obtaining and re-
taining employment in the FTZs and
tourism industry.
3 3 7
As these examples illustrate, some of the most serious labor
problems are occurring in the Dominican Republic. In light of
329. See id. § 5.
330. See id.
331. See id.
332. See id.
333. See id.
334. See id.
335. See id.; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PREGNANCY-BASED SEX DISCRIMINATION
IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC'S FREE TRADE ZONES: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.-CENTRAL
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (CAFTA) (Apr. 2004), available at http://hrw.org/
backgrounder/wrd/cafta-dr0404.htm. Nearly two thirds of the thirty-one women free
trade zone workers that Human Rights Watch interviewed in January 2004 reported
being subjected to mandatory pregnancy testing as a condition for access to work or as a
condition for maintaining their jobs. Id.
336. See STATE DEP'T DOMINICAN REPUBLIC REPORT, supra note 296, § 5.
337. See USTR REPORT, supra note 83, at 49.
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the ongoing labor issues in each of these countries, the next Part
analyzes the labor provisions in CAFTA.
III. ANALYSIS OF CAFTA'S LABOR PROVISIONS
Unlike some of the United States' other trading partners-
such as Chile and Singapore-that have arguably made advances
in their labor laws toward enforcement of core labor provi-
338sions, CAFTA countries lag far behind. Although the coun-
tries vary in their degree of labor and employment law protec-
tion, all have ongoing enforcement issues. This presents a for-
midable situation, which could have been addressed by CAFTA.
Like many of its predecessor FTAs, however, CAFTA falls short
of the TPA mandate because it does not fully meet the requisite
negotiating objectives. As a threshold matter, CAFTA unfortu-
nately does not require El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nica-
ragua, Costa Rica or the Dominican Republic to revise their laws
to increase labor standards to more closely mirror international
core labor rights.3"9 Another central deficiency in CAFTA's la-
bor provisions is that they lack meaningful enforcement provi-
sions; despite recognized internal problems in each country with
enforcement, the agreement permits signatory countries to
agree to enforce their own laws. 3 40 A related fundamental short-
coming of CAFTA's labor chapter is in the area of dispute reso-
lution. Instead of tying remedies to trade sanctions, "damage"
assessments are limited and are not paid to the injured party. 41
This is not an adequate incentive for countries to enforce their
labor laws. Lastly, while it is laudable that CAFTA creates a La-
bor Cooperation and Capacity Building Mechanism to improve
labor standards in the region, 42 this mechanism cannot be suc-
cessful without adequate funding. As it stands, it is unclear if
sufficient funding will be available to effectuate the envisioned
tasks. As such, the labor provisions in CAFTA are inadequate to
fully realize the objectives of the TPA.343
338. See, e.g., BOLLE, supra note 14, at 4.
339. See CAFTA, supra note 2, art. 16.2(1)(a).
340. See id. art. 16.2(1) (a); see also ILRF TESTIMONY, supra note 168, at 1-2
("CAFTA's labor chapter effectively sets the fox to guard the henhouse.").
341. See CAFTA, supra note 2, annex 20.17(2).
342. See id. art. 16.5.
343. See AFL-CIO, USTR MISLEADS CONGRESS ON CAFTA LABOR PROVISIONS
(2004), available at http://www.aflcio.org/issues/jobseconomy/globaleconomy/
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On the surface, CAFTA appears to be positioned to contain
comprehensive provisions. The Preamble to the agreement
states the parties' resolve to:
Protect, enhance, and enforce basic workers' rights and
strengthen their cooperation on labor matters;
Create new employment opportunities and improve working
conditions and living standards in their respective territories;
Build on their respective international commitments on labor
matters., 4
This language suggests that the parties are committed to in-
creasing and enforcing international core labor standards with
this agreement. Likewise, in the first section of CAFTA's chapter
on labor, the parties also adopt a Statement of Shared Commit-
ment in which they "reaffirm their obligations" as members of
the ILO and their "commitments under the ILO Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up.
345
This ambitious language, however, is quickly undercut, revealing
that CAFTA does not require any revision of labor laws to in-
crease standards consistent with international core labor rights.
The United States and CAFTA countries merely agree "to strive
to ensure" that such labor principles and "internationally recog-
nized labor rights" are "recognized and protected by" domestic
law.3 46 Moreover, the countries "shall strive to ensure" that their
laws provide for labor standards consistent with the internation-
ally recognized labor standards set forth in the agreement and
"shall strive to improve" their labor standards in that light.347
Consistent with the TPA, CAFTA defines internationally recog-
nized labor rights as: (a) the right of association; (b) the right to
organize and bargain collectively; (c) a prohibition against any
upload/USTRMisleads Congress-on-CAFTA.pdf. Note that to the extent that the
U.S.-Dominican Free Trade Agreement relies on the labor provisions of CAFTA, it is
not discussed separately herein. See generally CAFTA, supra note 2. See also LAC, THE
U.S.-DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: REPORT OF THE LABOR ADVISORY
COMMITTEE FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AND TRADE POLICY 4, 6-7 (Apr. 22, 2004), available
at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/DRReports/as-
set.upload-filel2_3321.pdf. See generally HORNBECK, supra note 136, at 29 (recognizing
that, inasmuch as the dispute settlement procedures for labor and commercial disputes
do not operate identically, "it may be a matter of interpretation as to whether there is a
problem in their meeting congressional negotiating objectives").
344. CAFTA, supra note 2, at pmbl.
345. Id. art. 16.1 (1); see also LO Declaration, supra note 89, § 2(a)-(d).
346. See CAFTA, supra note 2, art. 16.1(1).
347. See id. art. 16.1(2).
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form of forced or compulsory labor; (d) labor protections for
children and young people, including a minimum age for the
employment of children and the prohibition and elimination of
the worst forms of child labor; and (e) acceptable conditions of
work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occu-
pational safety and health.34 Ironically, with the exception of
the United States, most of the ILO core conventions have been
ratified by CAFTA countries:349
TABLE 8: Ratifications of the ILO Fundamental Conventions
Freedom of
Forced Labor Association Discrimination Child Labor
Country Conv. Conv. Conv. Conv. Conv. Conv. Conv. Conv.
29 105 87 98 100 11 138 182
United States - 1991 - - - - - 1999
Costa Rica 1960 1959 1960 1960 1960 1962 1976 2001
El Salvador 1995 1958 - - 2000 1995 1996 2000
Guatemala 1989 1959 1952 1952 1961 1960 1990 2001
Honduras 1957 1958 1956 1956 1956 1960 1980 2001
Nicaragua 1934 1967 1967 1967 1967 1967 1981 2000
Dominican
Republic 1956 1958 1956 1953 1953 1964 1999 2001
Unfortunately, "striving to ensure" does not require the
countries to enact laws to meet the ILO's core labor standards.
Striving is only an aspirational statement that efforts will be at-
tempted. As was seen in Part II, even though many of the ILO
core conventions have been adopted, there are serious, ongoing
labor problems in each of these areas. Additionally, despite
these affirmations, concern is also raised by the accompanying
footnote reminder in the Statement of Shared Commitment that
348. See id. art. 16.8(a)-(e).
349. See ILO, Fundamental Convention Ratifications, http://webfusion.ilo.org/pub-
lic/db/standards/normes/app/appl-raticonv.cfm?Lang=EN (last visited Sept. 28,
2005). Although the United States has not ratified a number of these conventions, in
many instances, it has domestic protection. See Thomas Niles, Letter to the Editor, FiN.
TIMES (London), Sept. 7, 2004, at 14; see also Richard McIntyre & Matthew M. Bodah,
The US and ILO Conventions No. 87 and No. 98: The Freedom of Association and Right to
Bargain Collectively, AFL-CIO/Michigan State University Worker Right Conference (Oct.
11, 2002) available at http://www.lir.msu.edu/event/worker-rights/Mcntyre-
Bodah%20Paper.doc.
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"labor standards should not be used for protectionist trade pur-
poses."35 By including this statement, the specter is raised that
any challenge to a labor practice will be met with the defense
that the allegations are merely made for protectionist purposes.
Next, although many of the CAFTA countries have revised
their labor laws to move more in line with international stan-
dards, 51 there is an overall lack of meaningful enforcement of
those laws. 52 CAFITA does not remedy this problem in its En-
forcement of Labor Laws section. 53 The parties merely agree
that they will "not fail to effectively enforce" their labor laws
"through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction,
in a manner affecting trade between the parties." '54 By recogniz-
ing that they each retain the "right to exercise discretion with
respect to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compli-
ance matters and to make decisions regarding the allocation of
resources to enforcement," '55 the burden is on each country to
enforce its laws-even though the judicial systems are currently
not reliable.356 The requirement that each party enforce its la-
bor laws is further eviscerated by a provision providing that a
party is in compliance with the labor chapter "where a course of
action or inaction reflects a reasonable exercise of such discre-
tion, or results from a bonafide decision regarding the allocation
of resources." '57 As a practical matter, this high degree of discre-
tion will make it extremely difficult for any challenges to be suc-
cessfully made against a CAFTA country.
Moreover, there is concern about the lack of enforcement
should a country weaken its labor law. In the last part of the
enforcement section of the labor chapter, the parties recognize
that "it is inappropriate to encourage trade or investment by
weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic la-
350. See CAFTA, supra note 2, art. 16.1 n.1; see also ILO Declaration, supra note 89,
sec. 5.
351. See generally USTR REPORT, supra note 83 (detailing the status of labor laws in
each country).
352. See id.
353. See CAFTA, supra note 2, art. 16.2.
354. See id. art. 16.2(1)(a).
355. See id. art. 16.2(1)(b).
356. See supra Part II (discussing problems with existing labor laws in CAFTA coun-
tries).
357. CAFTA, supra note 2, art 16.2(1)(b). See generally PUBLIC CITIZEN, CAFTA AND
LABOR RIGHTS: NEW ANNOTATED VERSION OF KEY CAFTA LABOR TEXT, available at http:/
/www.citizen.org/documents/ACFIC98.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
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bor laws." 5' Accordingly, each party agrees to "strive to ensure
that it does not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to
waive or otherwise derogate from, such laws in a manner that
weakens or reduces adherence to the internationally recognized
labor rights" identified in the agreement. 59 This is very weak
language with no real recourse should a party weaken existing
labor protections. Even before CAFTA was ratified, the Interna-
tional Labor Rights Fund filed petitions with the U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative alleging that steps were being taken in Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to weaken their existing la-
bor laws.3 6 ° CAFTA's "Enforcement of Labor Laws" article may
sound effective, yet it is illusory; the parties are only required to
enforce existing laws, which may be flawed.3"1
The real shortcoming of CAFTA is in dispute resolution.
Arguably, CAFTA "actually backtracks" from the Jordan FTA and
from the unilateral trade preference programs.36 2  Unlike
CAFTA, unilateral trade preference programs provide for the
withdrawal of trade benefits if agreed-upon steps are not taken
to meet international core labor standards. 63 The lack of mean-
ingful enforcement is particularly troubling with regard to
CAFTA countries, because much of the labor law reform that has
taken place in Central America can be directly tied to the threat
of withdrawal of trade benefits under the United States' prefer-
ence programs.364 The TPA provides that with respect to dispute
settlement and enforcement of trade agreements the principle
negotiating objectives should be treated equally with respect to:
"the ability to resort to dispute settlement under the applicable
agreement; the availability of equivalent dispute settlement pro-
cedures; and the ability of equivalent remedies." '365 CAFTA fails
358. CAFTA, supra note 2, art. 16.2(2).
359. Id.
360. See INT'L LABOR RIGHTS FUND, WATCHDOG FILES PROTEST WITH U.S. TRADE REP-
RESENTATIVE OVER LABOR RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA: ACTION COMES AS
SEVERAL COUNTRIES WEAKEN LABOR LAWS AS CAFTA RATIFICATION VOTES NEAR (Dec. 16,
2004), available at http://www.laborrights.org/projects/linklabor/GSPCentraAm_
1204.htm. The specific petitions filed are also available at this site.
361. See CAFTA, supra note 2, art. 16.2.
362. See CAFTA LAC REPORT, supra note 140, at 7.
363. See AFL-CIO, CAFTA WEAKENS EXISTING LABOR RIGHTS PROTECTIONS FOR CEN-
TRAL AMERICAN WORKERS (2005), available at www.aflcio.org/issues/jobseconomy/
globaleconomy/upload/CAFrA factsheet.pdf.
364. See CAFTA LAC REPORT, supra note 140, at 7.
365. TPA, 19 U.S.C.S. § 3802(b) (12) (G) (2005).
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to treat labor and commercial negotiating objectives equally. If
a party is aggrieved under the labor chapter, it may request a
"consultation. 366 To the extent that the consultation does not
resolve the matter, either party may request that the Labor Af-
fairs Council be convened.3 67 These procedures, however, only
apply to a dispute arising from a party's alleged failure to effec-
tively enforce its own labor laws.36 Failure to comply with inter-
nationally recognized labor standards is not actionable. 69
Another shortcoming of labor dispute resolution under
CAFTA is the cap on fines and sanctions °.3 7  The penalty for a
party failing to enforce its own laws is capped at fifteen million
U.S. dollars. 37' To determine the amount of the "assessment,"
the panel is to take into account:
(a) the bilateral trade effects of the Party's failure to effec-
tively enforce the relevant law;
(b) the pervasiveness and duration of the party's failure to
effectively enforce the relevant law;
(c) the reasons for the Party's failure to effectively enforce
the relevant law;
(d) the level of enforcement that could reasonably be ex-
pected of the Party given its resource constraints;
(e) the efforts made by the Party to begin remedying the non-
enforcement after the final report of the panel, including
through the implementation of any mutually agreed upon ac-
tion plan; and
(f) any other relevant factors.3 72
The "assessment" is to be paid into a fund and used for appropri-
ate labor law initiatives373-not to compensate the injured party.
The cap on the assessments may not be sufficient to deter viola-
tions, especially as the volume of trade increases-fifteen million
U.S. dollars will likely be a minimal sum compared to the com-
petitive advantage to be gained by violating labor laws.374 More-
366. See CAFTA, supra note 2, art. 16.6(1).
367. See id. art. 16(4). The Labor Affairs Council is to be established under
CAFTA, comprised of cabinet-level or equivalent representatives of the parties, or their
designees. Id. 16.4(1).
368. See id. art. 16.6(7).
369. See id. arts. 16.2(1)(a), 16.6(7).
370. See id. art. 20.17(2).
371. See id.
372. See id.
373. See id. art. 20.17(4).
374. See WEAK LABOR RIGHTS PROTECrIONS, supra note 5, at 4-5.
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over, the "factors" to be considered by the dispute resolution
panel inherently circumscribe the extent of the assessment;3 75 in
a commercial dispute, the panel is not under any such direction.
For commercial disputes, after considering the final report of
the dispute panel, if the parties are unable to agree on compen-
sation or if one party fails to observe the terms of an agreement,
the complaining party may provide written notice that it "in-
tends to suspend the application to the other Party of benefits of
equivalent effect. '3 76 These labor dispute resolution procedures
and penalties fall short of being equivalent remedies. An assess-
ment is simply not the same as trade sanctions. As such,
CAFTA's assessment provisions do not comply with the plain lan-
guage or spirit of the TPA.
Lastly, inasmuch as funding is uncertain, the effectiveness of
the Labor Cooperation and Capacity Building Mechanism 77 is
questionable. 37 This provision requires the parties to cooperate
on a wide range of labor issues including, but not limited to, the
ILO core labor conventions (such as the worst forms of child
labor); labor administration; labor inspection systems; alterna-
tive dispute resolution; labor relations; working conditions; mi-
grant workers; social assistance programs; labor statistics; em-
ployment opportunities; gender; and technical issues.37 9 Given
the serious labor issues in Central America and the Dominican
Republic, these are very worthwhile goals. But because CAFTA
does not guarantee a certain level of funding, it is difficult to
know how effective this mechanism will be in practice.
These inadequacies of CAFTA were not lost on advocates
for international labor standards. The TPA requires that advi-
sory committees provide the President, the USTR, and Congress
with reports on any proposed FTA. 8 ° The Labor Advisory Com-
mittee ("LAC") report prepared on CAFTA concluded that the
"labor provisions in CAFTA are unacceptable."3 '' Acknowledg-
ing that CAFTA falls short of the TPA negotiating objectives, the
report states that the labor provisions will "drag down workers in
375. See CAFTA, supra note 2, art. 20.17(2).
376. Id. art. 20.16(2).
377. See id. art. 16.5.
378. See generally WEAK LABOR RIGHTS PROTECTIONS, supra note 5, at 4.
379. See CAFTA, supra note 2, annex 16.5(3)(a)-(m).
380. See TPA, 19 U.S.C.S. § 3804(e) (2005).
381. CAFTA LAC REPORT, supra note 140, at 10.
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the region into an even more desperate cycle of poverty and mis-
ery [that] will only increase opportunities and incentives for em-
ployers to fire, harass, intimidate and threaten workers who try
to form unions and dare to ask for decent wages. 8382 Despite the
LAC reports, as well as opposition from labor groups and human
rights groups, 83 CAFTA was passed by the U.S. Congress.384
IV. GOING ONE STEP FURTHER A PROPOSAL FOR MORE
EFFECTIVE LABOR PROVISIONS IN US. FREE
TRADE AGREEMENTS
By not including more effective and comprehensive labor
provisions in CAFTA, the United States has squandered an op-
portunity that could have improved labor conditions around the
world and also level the playing field for American workers. The
United States should take the "high road" of globalization, seek-
ing to enforce the internationally recognized labor rights that
the U.S. Congress intended to be included-in a meaningful
way-in F[As.138 As it now stands, despite several pages of "labor
provisions" in CAFTA, it just boils down to a simple provision:
Each party is to enforce its existing laws. This is simply inade-
quate. The only way to ensure that the United States' trading
382. Id. Note that there was no official response to the CAFTA LAC report. Cf
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, RESPONSE TO LABOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE
REPORT ON THE PROPOSED CHILE AND SINGAPORE FTAs, available at http://www.ustr.gov/
assets/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/SingaporeFTA/Reports/assetuploadfile763_
3221.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2005) (outlining an official response to the LAC report
on the proposed FTAs with Chile and Singapore).
383. See, e.g., Letter from Hector Flores, National President of the League of
United Latin American Citizens, to Member of Congress (June 24, 2004), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/LULAC%201etter%20on%20CAFTA.pdf. For a
collection of opposition documents authorized by labor groups and human rights
groups, amongst others, see the Public Citizen website, http://www.citizen.org/trade/
cafta/opposition/.
384. See supra notes 3, 5 and accompanying text (discussing CATA).
385. At this time, the United States is actively involved in negotiating ETAs all over
the world. For information about current trade negotiations, see the web site of the
USTR, http://www.ustr.gov/. One of the largest is the proposed Free Trade of the
Americas Agreement ("FTAA") with Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, the Bahamas,
Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Pica, Dominica, the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Hon-
duras,Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint
Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay
and Venezuela. For more information about the current status of the Free Trade of the
Americans Agreement, see http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Regional/FTAA/
SectionIndex.html.
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partners implement and enforce core labor rights is to tie them
to market access; failure to comply should result in trade sanc-
tions, and/or the loss of tariff reductions.
As opposed to the labor chapter in CAFTA, a much more
effective approach could be modeled after the trade agreement
between the United States and Jordan ('Jordan FTA").386 This
agreement, which was signed on October 24, 2000, is the first
FTA that the United States has entered into with an Arab
State.38 7 At this point, the Jordan FTA is considered the high-
water mark for labor provisions in a trade agreement.38 8  The
primary reason is that the labor provisions are incorporated into
the body of the agreement."'9 This is particularly important, be-
cause the dispute resolution procedures are the same for labor
disputes as they are for commercial issues.39 ° As such, if a dis-
pute cannot be resolved, the affected party "shall be entitled to
take any appropriate and commensurate measure;" 3 1 the labor
provisions of the Jordan FTA are not subject to watered-down
enforcement mechanisms. 92 Second, the parties to the Jordan
FTA reaffirmed their obligations as members of the ILO, agree-
386. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite King-
dom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, Oct. 24, 2000,
41 I.L.M. 63 [hereinafter Jordan FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/
TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Jordan/SectionIndex.html. The Agreement Between
the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the Establish-
ment of a Free Trade Area ("Jordan FTA") was the last major FTA negotiated and
signed before the change in presidential administrations. President Bill Clinton signed
this agreement in 2000. See The U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement: Fact Sheet [here-
inafter Jordan FTA: Fact Sheet], http://www.usembassy-amman.org.jo/FactSh.html
(last visited Sept. 23, 2005). The Jordan FTA was later ratified by Congress on Sept. 24,
2001. See US.-Jordan FTA Finding the Bottom Line, STAR (Jordan), Oct. 6, 2001. The Jor-
dan FTA went into force on December 17, 2001. See Fact Sheet: U.S.-Jordan Free Trade
Agreement, http://www.usembassy-amman.orgjo/12FTA-FS.html (last visited Sept. 23,
2005).
387. Mohammad Nsour, Fundamental Facets of the United States-Jordan Free Trade
Agreement: E-Commerce, Dispute Resolution, and Beyond, 27 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 742, 743
(2004).
388. See Press Release, Sen. Evan Bayh (D-IN), Statement From Senator Bayh on
CAFTA, June 30, 2005 (" [E] nforcement provisions in CAFTA are a step backward from
the recent free trade agreement with Jordan"), available at http://bayh.senate.gov/
-bayh/releases/2005/07/30JUNE05PR.htm; see also Jordan FTA Fact Sheet, supra note
386.
389. See Jordan ETA, supra note 386, art. 6.
390. See id. art. 17(1) (specifying the remedies for any violation of the Jordan
ETA).
391. Id. art. 17(2)(b).
392. See Jordan FA Fact Sheet, supra note 386.
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ing to "strive to ensure that such labor principles" are recog-
nized and protected by law.393 Third, the Jordan FTA has what
has been referred to as a "no relaxation" or "anti-relaxation" '
clause: Jordan FTA parties agree to "strive to ensure that [they
do] not waive or otherwise derogate from" their existing domes-
tic labor laws. 95 Ultimately, the parties agree that they will "not
fail to effectively enforce [their] labor laws, through a sustained
or recurring course of action or inaction," in a manner that af-
fects trade between the parties. 96 This provision is particularly
important because if Jordan is engaging in labor practices in vio-
lation of the Jordan FTA that affect trade under the agreement,
the United States can seek meaningful recourse.397
Similar to the Jordan FTA, the United States-Cambodia Bi-
lateral Textile Agreement ("Cambodia Textile Agreement") 398
contains incentives for our trading partner to enforce labor stan-
dards. 99 Under the Cambodia Textile Agreement, Cambodia
agrees to support the implementation of a program to improve
working conditions in the textile and apparel sectors, including
internationally recognized core labor standards. 40 ' To this end,
Cambodia is required to conduct at least two consultations each
agreement year to discuss "labor standards, specific benchmarks,
and the implementation of this program. '40 1 Based on these
consultations and the information gathered therein, the United
States then determines if the Cambodia textile and apparel sec-
tor are in substantial compliance with the agreed-upon labor
standards.40 2 If there is a positive determination, more favorable
trade provisions in the form of increased exports to the United
393. See Jordan FTA, supra note 386, art. 6(1).
394. See generally, ThomasJ. Manley and Luis Lauredo, International Labor Standards
in Free Trade Agreements of the Americas, 18 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 85, 105 (2004); Marley S.
Weiss, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back-Or Vice Versa: Labor Rights Under Free Trade Agree-
ments from NAPTA, Through Jordan via Chile, to Latin America and Beyond, 37 U.S.F. L. REv.
689, 714 (2003).
395. See Jordan FTA, supra note 386, art. 6(2).
396. See id. art. 6(4) (a).
397. See id. art. 6.
398. Agreement on Trade in Textiles and Textile Products, U.S.-Cambodia, Jan.
20, 1999, Hein's No. KAV 5781 [hereinafter Cambodia Textile Agreement].
399. See Jordan FTA, supra note 386.
400. See Cambodia Textile Agreement, supra note 398, 10(b).
401. See id. 10(c).
402. See id. 10(d).
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States are triggered.4 °3 Importantly, if there is a subsequent de-
termination that Cambodia has taken or failed to take a major
action resulting in a "significant change in working conditions,"
then the United States may withdraw the increase.40 4
Using the Jordan FTA and Cambodian Textile Agreement
as models, the following provisions are proposed for the United
States to include in all FTAs to fully meet its obligations under
the TPA. First, and fundamentally, all labor provisions should
be part of the body of the agreement, not a side agreement.40 5
Workers should be protected from unfair trade practices just as
the goods they produce are protected under the FTA.4 06 Up-
holding core international labor standards is essential to fair
trade; doing so does not create unfair protections for U.S. work-
ers. Studies by both the World Bank and the Brookings Institute
"document the positive links between trade, economic growth
and labor standards. 40 7
A. Preamble
Consistent with the objectives of the TPA, the Preamble to
all future FTAs should incorporate resolutions that specifically
relate to labor and the parties' resolve to:
9 Improve working conditions, by requiring respect for and
403. See id.
404. See id. See generally Andrew Wells-Dang, Linking Textiles to Labor Standards: Pros-
pects for Cambodia and Vietnam, FOREIGN POL'Y IN Focus (2002), available at http://
www.fpif.org/papers/txt-labor.html (discussing the link between the Cambodia Textile
Agreement and improved labor standards in Cambodia).
405. See generally MARY JANE BOLLE, NAFTA SIDE AGREEMENT: LESSONS FOR THE
WORKER RIGHTS AND FAST-TRACK DEBATE (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Con-
gress Order Code 97-861 E, Jan. 11, 2002), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/8118.pdf (outlining shortcomings of the NAFTA side agreement on la-
bor).
406. See generally Craig VanGrasstek, U.S. Law and Policy on the Linkage Between Labor
Rights and Trade, WASH. TRADE REP. (2000) (copy on file with author) (discussing the
use of trade sanctions as a penalty for producing goods produced through exploitative
labor practices).
407. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S.-Cambodian Tex-
tile Agreement Links Increasing Trade with Improving Workers' Rights (Jan. 1, 2002),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/PressReleases/2002/January/
US-CambodianTextileAgreemen tLinksIncreasingTradewithImprovingWork-
ers'-Rights.html (citing Gary Burtless, Workers' Rights, Labor Standards and Global Trade,
19:4 BROOINGS INST. REv. 10 (Fall 2001), available at http://www.brookings.edu/
press/review/fall2001 /burtless.htm).
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enforcement of worker rights and the rights of children consis-
tent with ILO core labor standards;
* Build on their understanding of the relationship between
trade and worker rights;
* Ensure that they do not weaken or reduce protections af-
forded in domestic labor laws as an encouragement of trade; and
* Require universal ratification and full compliance with
ILO Convention No. 182 Concerning the Prohibition and Im-
mediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child
Labor.
B. Labor Law Provisions
The main text of an FTA should include a separate article
on labor rights that addresses the goals and objectives of the
TPA. Provisions in this article should accomplish the following
general goals of the parties:
o Reaffirm their obligations as members of the ILO and
their commitments under the ILO Declaration;
e Agree to strengthen domestic law to be consistent with
core labor standards, defined as:
a) the right of association: workers shall have the right to
freedom of association free from any interference from pub-
lic authorities or their employers, consistent with ILO Con-
vention No. 87;
b) the right to organize and bargain collectively: workers
shall have the right to establish and join organizations of
their own choosing; workers shall enjoy adequate protection
against acts of anti-union discrimination in respect to their
employment, including employment that shall not be subject
to the condition that a worker not join a union and a worker
shall not be dismissed or otherwise prejudiced by reason of
union membership or because of participation in union activ-
ities outside working hours or, with the employer's consent,
within working hours, consistent with ILO Conventions No.
87 and No. 98;
c) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compul-
sory labor, meaning all work or service which is extracted
from any person under the menace of a penalty and for
which the person has not offered him or herself voluntarily;
additionally, forced or compulsory labor shall not be used as
a means of political coercion or education or as a punish-
ment for holding or expressing political views or views ideo-
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logically opposed to the establishment of political, social or
economic system; as a method of mobilizing and using labor
for purposes of economic development; as a means of labor
discipline; as a punishment for having participated in strikes;
or as a means of racial, social, national or religious discrimi-
nation, consistent with ILO Conventions No. 29 and No. 105;
d) a minimum age for the employment of children, consis-
tent with ILO Conventions No. 138 and No. 183; and
e) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum
wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health,
consistent, among other things, with ILO Conventions No.
100 and No. 111.408
e To require universal ratification and full compliance with
ILO Convention No. 182 Concerning the Prohibition and Im-
mediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child
Labor.
e To work toward full compliance with all other ILO Con-
ventions that the parties have or will ratify on an agreed-upon
schedule with each country that is appropriate given its eco-
nomic, social and legal circumstances.
* To the extent that a party's laws are inconsistent with their
ILO obligations and commitments or full legal recognition of
core labor standards, benchmarks need to be set with a schedule
of changes that need to be made with free trade benefits tied to
a clear and relatively short phase-in of those changes.4 °9
9 Use an independent oversight board (such as the ILO) to
determine the level of compliance, which would also take into
consideration annual comments by international groups who
monitor labor issues.4 10
o The parties must not fail to effectively enforce their labor
laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or inac-
tion, in a manner affecting trade between the United States and
408. This provision could be much more expansively interpreted consistent with
Part II, depending on the level of development of the United States' trading partners.
409. See generally Cambodia Textile Agreement, supra note 498 (providing for in-
creased imports in recognition of Cambodia's labor condition reforms in textile facto-
ries).
410. This process could be similar to that provided for under the GSP, which uses
an annual review process to determine a country's GSP eligibility; a country must take
or be taking steps to afford internationally recognized worker rights to workers in the
country, including any designated zone in that country. See Generalized System of Pref-
erences, 19 U.S.C.S. § 2462(b)(2)(G) (2005).
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that party after entry into force of a trade agreement between
those countries.
* The parties shall recognize that they retain the right to
exercise discretion with respect to investigatory, prosecutorial,
regulatory, and compliance matters and to make decisions re-
garding the allocation of resources to enforcement with respect
to other labor matters determined to have higher priorities, un-
less it is apparent that a country is not effectively enforcing its
laws.
* The parties shall not weaken, relax or reduce protections
afforded in domestic labor laws as an encouragement of trade;
to the extent there is any weakening, relaxing, or reduction in
domestic labor laws, the country shall be subject to trade sanc-
tions.
C. Dispute Resolution Procedures
* Any failure to comply with the labor provisions must be
subject to the same dispute resolution procedures used to re-
solve any disagreement under the agreement. Dispute resolu-
tion will expressly not be limited to a party's failure to enforce its
own labor laws.
* A party to the FTA should be able to bring an action
against another party.
* The dispute resolution proceedings should be open to the
public.
D. Enforcement/Remedies/Penalties
* Trade sanctions should be available for disputes regarding
any provision of the labor article the same as they are for a com-
mercial dispute, in the form of suspension of tariff benefits and/
or payment of penalties or fines.
* Goods manufactured in violation of a member's labor laws
should not be allowed to be imported into the United States.
E. Labor Cooperation and Capacity Building Mechanism
* A specific provision for adequate funding should be in-
cluded to ensure that the goals of improving labor laws and en-
forcement can be met.
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CONCLUSION
When negotiating FTAs, the United States is at a point
where it can seize the opportunity to improve the labor stan-
dards of its trading partners, and hold countries and companies
accountable to internationally recognized labor standards. An
easier alternative is to look the other way, hoping that with time
and increased trade, labor standards will improve. The United
States should, however, actively pursue a trade agenda that cre-
ates "high-road competition based on skills and productivity"
that is positive for all workers in the global workplace, as op-
posed to creating "low-road competition based on low wages,
poor working conditions, and weak workers' rights" that "drags
all workers down into a race to the bottom."" American work-
ers deserve better than being placed in the global workplace on
an unfair playing field under the guise of free trade. Decades of
work by the ILO and other international groups to promote core
international labor standards could move toward full realization
if the United States required its trading partners to abide by
these minimum thresholds. Access to United States markets
should be a reward for countries enforcing core labor standards;
our trading partners should not be allowed to suppress their
workers, thereby creating unfair competition. Countries who
fail to protect basic labor standards simply should not be granted
an unfair trade advantage via the United States' FTAs.
411. LAC, THE U.S.-DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: REPORT OF THE
LABOR ADVISORY COMMITrEE FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AND TRADE POLICY 4 (Apr. 22,
2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade.Agreements/Bilateral/CAFrA/
DRReports/asset-upload-filel2_3321.pdf.
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